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 I contend that the treatment/enhancement distinction is inherently only 
able to provide limited aid to arguments in bioethics concerning ethically 
controversial issues of resource distribution. Rather, normative assumptions 
about concepts such as human functioning, normality, health, and/or disease 
that the treatment/enhancement distinction relies on are the primary ethical 
motivators in distributive justice arguments that consider some medical 
intervention to be treatment and some medical intervention to be 
enhancement. Therefore, if arguments are to use the treatment/enhancement 
distinction to draw conclusions about justice in health care, they must make 
additional normative assumptions about human functioning and the role of 
health care. These distributive justice arguments then rely on the additional 
normative assumptions about human functioning and the role of health care 
to draw conclusions about treatment and enhancement. Arguments using the 
treatment/enhancement distinction have not, however, acknowledged these 
additional normative assumptions. 
 In this dissertation, I make the argument that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is not an independent concept. 
Additionally, I examine ways to cohesively fit consideration for individuals 
 iv 
who seek medical intervention for enhancement purposes into accounts of 
just health care. To do this, I examine arguments concerning growth hormone 
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 Arguments concerning the just allocation of medical resources embody a 
central concern of bioethics: What are just ways to treat patients?  In 
bioethics, a common way to ground arguments for particular distributive 
justice standards is to utilize what the literature calls the 
treatment/enhancement distinction. The treatment/enhancement distinction 
is a distinction between medical intervention that health care policies, 
medical insurance policies, and some bioethicists consider to be medically 
necessary, or required for health, from medical intervention that is 
considered to be medically unnecessary, or not required for health. 
 Medical intervention that aims to restore, maintain, and/or improve 
health by preventing or curing a condition, impairment, illness, or disease is 
typically considered “treatment” (Buchanan et al., 2000; Colleton, 2008). 
Explanations of treatment may be followed by the claim that individuals who 
are thought to be seeking treatment ought to be prioritized over individuals 
who are thought to be seeking enhancement. Enhancement is typically 
considered to be medical intervention that aims to improve health and/or 
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human abilities beyond what is considered normal human functioning 
(Buchanan et al., 2000, Colleton, 2008). 
 Advances in biotechnology create new, advanced ways in which we can 
enhance our lives. Along with older, more traditional practices, we now also 
have new and advanced practices to help us end the ways in which we 
physically, emotionally, and mentally suffer from our ailments, shortcomings, 
and inabilities. We can enhance our muscle tone, our vision, and our cognitive 
capabilities by using biotechnology; however, reasonable precautions about 
how and who is taking advantage of enhancement practices are necessary to 
ensure that the goals of medicine as a profession are accomplished, that 
patient safety is protected, and that patients are treated fairly, among other 
reasons that I discuss in this dissertation. 
 The wide availability of numerous enhancement practices and the 
limited availability of other enhancement practices and their possible 
contributions to class, economic, intellectual, and physical inequalities, create 
the need to manage the distribution of enhancement practices. Yet we must 
be cautious without being overly limiting. Accounts of just health care 
typically favor medical intervention for individuals seeking treatment, rather 
than individuals seeking enhancement. The contentious nature of what 
medical intervention is considered treatment and what intervention is 
considered enhancement, however, and on what grounds this distinction is 
made, cannot be overlooked in determining how to implement practices that 
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ensure justice for individuals seeking treatment as well as individuals 
seeking enhancement. 
 In this dissertation, I argue that the treatment/enhancement distinction 
is not an independent concept. Therefore, it cannot be used by distributive 
justice arguments that draw conclusions other than the conclusion that some 
uses of medical intervention are treatment and some uses of medical 
intervention are enhancement. Stronger arguments are beyond the scope of 
the treatment/enhancement distinction alone. Stronger arguments that 
distinguish between treatment and enhancement must first make normative 
claims about what is disease, what is health, what is proper human 
functioning, and what is the role of medicine. Throughout this dissertation, I 
examine functionalist, empirical, and etiological explanations of disease and 
health. I then show how these explanations influence conclusions that 
distinguish between treatment and enhancement. 
 
Dissertation Goals 
 The principal goal of this dissertation is to present arguments that 
utilize the treatment/enhancement distinction to draw conclusions about 
what is just health care and to then show how explanations of other concepts 
are the main ethical motivators in these arguments. A corollary goal of this 
dissertation is to show the difficulty of separating many instances of 
treatment from enhancement; however, many theories of just health care 
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continue to separate these two types of medical intervention for purposes 
including distributive justice in the practice of medicine and minimization of 
the financial costs of health care. Although these may be legitimate reasons 
to distinguish between treatment and enhancement, these reasons have to be 
weighed against the needs of individuals and the likelihood of individuals 
benefiting from medical intervention. 
Other than utilitarian accounts of the treatment/enhancement 
distinction, accounts of just health care typically make the needs of 
individuals seeking enhancement secondary to the needs of individuals 
seeking treatment. Contrary to these accounts of just health care, an 
additional goal of this dissertation is to show that a theory of just health care 
must include ways to ensure justice for individuals seeking enhancement 
when it is difficult to clearly distinguish treatment from enhancement and 
the medical intervention at issue is considered to be safe. 
Although there may be some instances when it is easy to distinguish 
between treatment and enhancement, using the treatment/enhancement 
distinction to address medical intervention is ethically arbitrary in at least 
one instance—when individuals seeking what medical institutions consider to 
be enhancement experience the same state of being that is regarded as 
problematic as individuals seeking treatment. This means that as a matter of 
justice, the needs of some individuals seeking enhancement ought not to be 
prioritized below some individuals seeking treatment and individuals seeking 
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enhancement ought to at least be given consideration in accounts of just 
health care. 
 
Summary of Chapters 
This dissertation is split into two parts. In Part I, I focus specifically on 
the treatment/enhancement distinction and the concepts it relies on and 
examples of how the treatment/enhancement distinction is used in 
arguments concerning distributive justice.  
I begin with Chapter 2. In it I discuss the necessary concepts that are 
related to the treatment/enhancement distinction. I then discuss how these 
concepts are utilized by equal opportunity and prioritarian accounts of just 
health care. I then discuss how each account of just health care addresses the 
treatment/enhancement distinction and how it is used to draw conclusions 
about how to justly allocate medical resources. I conclude this chapter by 
using a case study to show the difficulties of only using the 
treatment/enhancement distinction to determine acceptability of intervention 
and how other concepts, as used by accounts of just health care, are necessary 
to draw conclusions in bioethics. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss one of the most common examples of the 
treatment/enhancement distinction in arguments concerning just health care: 
growth hormone (GH) therapy distributed to two children of equal height—
‘child GHD’ with a growth hormone deficiency (GHD) as a means of 
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therapeutic intervention and GH therapy distributed to ‘child short’ who is 
not GH deficient as a means of enhancement. In Chapter 3, I present the 
different treatment of these two children to demonstrate the common 
argument that because a normal short child uses GH for enhancing purposes, 
she should not be allowed to have GH treatment. There is research that 
claims that GH treatment can increase the adult height of children without 
GHD to a height that they could not have reached without medical 
intervention. There are also examples of children without GHD who are of 
the same height as children with GHD. Despite both the research and these 
examples, some arguments still conclude that children without GHD are not 
entitled to GH therapy, as a matter of just health care. I also present 
examples in which the treatment/enhancement distinction is not the driving 
force in these kinds of arguments. Instead, normative assumptions about 
what conditions are diseases, what is proper human functioning, and what is 
the proper role of health care are the normative claims that motivate what 
are commonly referred to as diagnosis-based arguments. I use the GH 
therapy example as a way to highlight a just health care dilemma—whether 
we should focus on the presence of disease to determine entitlement to 
treatment or on the shared height of individuals with and without disease 
when determining obligations to medically intervene. 
In Part II of this dissertation, I focus on justice for individuals seeking 
to use medical resources for what health care considers enhancement and the 
  
7 
arguments employed to support the use of enhancement practices in 
particular settings. I also examine ways in which individuals seek 
enhancement practices to attain goals or to better their lives. By examining 
these uses of enhancement, I show the importance of context when making 
decisions about what practices are considered enhancement and treatment. 
Although the treatment/enhancement distinction sometimes aligns with the 
distinction between permissible and impermissible, there are occasions when 
they do not align. 
In Chapter 4, I examine the use of performance enhancing substances 
in sports. I then abstract the use of these substances from the common arena 
of sports and examine their use in entertainment, or the performing arts. 
Comparing the use of performance enhancing substances in sports to their 
use in entertainment highlights the contextual nature of determining what 
practices are considered enhancement. Subsequently, this comparison also 
highlights other relevant information that influences judgments concerning 
the acceptability of performance enhancing substances, including a sense of 
fairness and level playing fields. 
 In Chapter 5, I examine some of the major objections to the use of 
different types of biological and nonbiological cognitive enhancing practices. I 
contend that these objections must be addressed in relation to normally and 
abnormally functioning individuals because of the potential contributions to 
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social and financial advancements, and the personal growth that both types 
of cognitive enhancement practices can offer. 
 In Chapter 6, I conclude this dissertation with a review of the 
arguments that apply to all types of enhancement practices that I discuss in 
this dissertation.  I also discuss what these arguments imply for just health 
care. Lastly, I discuss the importance of focusing on the undesirable effects of 
disease and ailments that make individuals seeking enhancement similar to 
individuals seeking treatment rather than focusing on the diagnoses that 



























 A goal of this dissertation is to examine arguments that utilize the 
treatment/enhancement distinction and to reveal the other concepts that the 
arguments employ to make claims about what medical intervention is 
considered treatment or enhancement. A corollary goal is to present ways 
that some individuals seeking medical intervention for purposes of 
enhancement can have their needs met within particular accounts of just 
health care. 
 My goal is not to claim that there are no differences between treatment 
and enhancement practices. My goal, however, is to provide a philosophical 
analysis of the treatment/enhancement distinction that reveals the normative 
assumptions about the role of health care, what conditions are considered 
diseases, and what states of being are considered healthy that are used in 
judgments about whether a medical intervention should be characterized as 
treatment or enhancement. 
 This chapter is divided into two parts. In Part 1 of this chapter, I 
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present prevalent accounts of disease, health, and human functioning. I also 
discuss how several important nonutilitarian and egalitarian accounts of just 
health care employ these concepts. In Part 2, I present an example of an 
individual’s two uses of medical resources. I then show how drawing 
conclusions about whether her use of medical resources can be thought of as 
treatment or enhancement depends on employment of the concept of normal 
functioning. 
 In “Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice,” Daniels (1981) states 
that a theory of health care needs should capture the ways in which health 
care might be “special” and ought to be distributed in a just manner. 
Furthermore, to determine the ways in which health care might be special, 
we ought to compare it to other social goods that we find important and have 
already determined how to distribute justly. In addition, a theory of health 
care needs should allow us to distinguish between more important health 
care services and less important health care services. Our task as Daniels 
sees it is to provide a philosophical analysis of why health care is special and 
what distinctions can be made about the services health care provides 
(Daniels, 1985, 1981). This chapter, and my dissertation as a whole, takes on 
an aspect of this task. My first step is a philosophical analysis of accounts of 
health care and what we want accounts of health care to do for us. 
 In this chapter, I commonly refer to “accounts of just health care” to 
include a wide range of claims. Where distinctions among these claims are 
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needed for my argument, these distinctions are made. As a general matter, I 
use “accounts of just health care” to refer to a family of claims about the 
duties of health care personnel to properly distribute their time, knowledge, 
services, and resources to individuals and who should be financially 
responsible for the distribution of these goods. “Accounts of just health care” 
will also refer to general accounts about just (or proper) ways to treat 
individuals and to particular claims about just (or proper) ways to treat 
individuals, which are both used as a basis for how medical institutions ought 
to treat individuals. For instance, an account of just health care may state 
that health care personnel are obligated to prioritize individuals who desire 
what their profession or institution considers to be treatment before 
individuals who desire what their profession or institution considers to be 
enhancement based on conceptions of effective hospital management. Based 
on the criteria for a proper philosophical analysis of health care theories set 
forth by Daniels (1981), this chapter explores how various theories meet his 
criteria and expands the requirements for what we want a theory of health 
care to do for us. 
 
Part 1: Boorse on Functionalist Accounts of Disease and Health 
 Theories of just health care often rely upon an account of normal in 
which normal is an evaluative concept explained in terms of cultural or 
ethical norms (Wachbroit, 1994). Theories of health care also often rely upon 
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more prominent accounts of health and disease in which both are defined in 
terms of human function. For example, etiological explanations of function 
state that the proper function of a part is explained by what actions the part 
was naturally selected to perform (Millikan, 1989; Wright, 1973). Given this 
etiological approach, when the body, or its parts, are performing the actions 
that it was naturally selected to perform, it can be thought of as healthy and 
when the body is not performing the actions it was naturally selected to 
perform, it can be thought of as diseased. This would be the case when a 
heart is not properly pumping blood, the action it is thought to be designed to 
perform. 
 In this section, I will discuss a functionalist account of health and 
disease as described by Boorse (1975, 1977). I focus on Boorse because the 
treatment/enhancement distinction, which is the primary target of this 
dissertation, operates in just health care arguments as a tool to designate 
individuals’ levels of function and then to separate individuals based on that 
level of functioning and lastly to determine obligations to treat based on those 
designations. Then I will discuss what relying on Boorse’s account of health 
and disease means for the treatment/enhancement distinction. 
 In his functionalist accounts of health and disease, Boorse (1975, 1977)  
uses explanations of normality and proper functioning to distinguish disease 
from health. According to Boorse (1975, 1977), the body has goal-oriented 
parts and when those parts are functioning normally, or according to their 
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biological function as determined by factors unique to the individual such as 
age or sex, the body can be thought of as being healthy. Conversely, when the 
body or the parts that comprise it deviate from normal functioning, the body 
or its parts can be thought to have a disease. Under Boorse’s theory of health 
and disease it seems plausible that a part of the body can function 
abnormally without the entire body of the individual and the body’s other 
parts being thought to be unhealthy. 
 Boorse’s account of health, simply put, is that health is proper 
functioning and disease is abnormal functioning. This is a very simplistic 
view; however, it is at the minimum a way to distinguish between cases when 
it is easy to distinguish between treatment and enhancement. That is, 
Boorse’s view can be used to make the distinction when there are few factors 
that would lead health care personnel to believe that an individual is using 
health care resources to function beyond normal or for intervention that is 
medically unnecessary. 
 Benditt (2007) gives a more recent account of disease that is similar to 
Boorse’s account of disease. Benditt’s account is grounded in an idea of 
normal function in which body parts have particular functions and these 
functions have a range of activity. When the body does not function within a 
particular range, the body cannot complete its biological function, making the 
body biologically abnormal, or diseased. As Benditt states, some scholars like 
Alice Dreger (1998) and Anita Silvers (1998) worry that defining disease as 
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abnormal functioning can easily turn any difference in function into a 
disease. A further concern is that defining disease as abnormal functioning 
leads to the assumption that any time an individual is functioning 
differently, we assume that she must be treated and her functioning restored 
to normal. 
 Explaining disease in terms of abnormality and in turn health in terms 
of normality, however, is not problematic in Benditt’s view (2007). He 
contends that Dreger and Silvers’ concerns only arise when from “abnormal” 
we draw the inference “must be fixed.” Although Benditt (2007) concludes 
that explanations of normal ought not to determine the role of medicine, he 
acknowledges that they have been taken to do so in some cases. For example, 
he acknowledges the argument that explanations of normal ought to 
determine the outer boundaries of medicine, in particular the argument that 
enhancements are beyond the scope of medicine’s obligations. Additionally, 
Benditt (2007) concludes that explanations of normal may be useful in some 
areas of life, such as creating the boundaries of athletic competitions within 
which athletes must compete. In athletic competitions, normal refers to 
athletes whose abilities are not aided by enhancements, thus making 
competition interesting to audiences. In athletic competitions, athletes who 
are not enhanced by drugs ensures the type of competition that spectators 
want to see. Although Benditt (2007) sees a place for normal in athletic 
competitions, he remains unconvinced that explanations of normal ought to 
  
16 
determine the boundaries of medicine and the obligations of medical 
personnel.  
 According to Schwartz (2007), functionalist accounts of human 
functioning that invoke the concept of normality and abnormality must 
address what he refers to as the “line drawing problem.”  The “line drawing 
problem” is questioning where to draw the line between low normal function 
and dysfunction. Functionalist accounts of human functioning do not 
adequately address this problem because they rely on a conceptual analysis 
approach to explaining the differences between normal and abnormal; 
however, a conceptual analysis focuses on unreliable and continuously 
changing lingual norms (Schwartz, 2007). 
 Schwartz (2007) proposes his own solution to the “line drawing problem” 
known as the “frequency and negative consequences approach” (FNC). This 
approach draws a line between low normal function and dysfunction based on 
a statistical analysis of the level of functioning in a reference class and the 
negative consequences that result from a particular level of functioning. 
Schwartz represents one such account of normal functioning that can respond 
to the line-drawing problem, a statistical approach. 
 This section has presented several selected accounts of common concepts 
in bioethics, including disease, health, normality, and human functioning. 
Some accounts focus on the function that body parts were designed to 
perform, while other accounts focus on how individual functioning deviates 
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from human functioning that is typically found in the general population. 
When the treatment/enhancement distinction is employed by just health care 
arguments, it is frequently used to determine health care’s personnel’s 
obligations to patients. However, to employ the treatment/enhancement 
distinction, accounts of who are healthy and who are unhealthy must first be 
employed. This is what accounts of health and disease, like those given by 
Boorse, do for just health care arguments. 
 Relying on this brief sketch of Boorse’s accounts of health and disease, 
the treatment/enhancement distinction becomes a distinction between 
ameliorating disease and improving upon an already healthy body. Boorse’s 
account of health and disease supports this traditional explanation of the 
treatment/enhancement distinction; however, as this dissertation argues, 
that does not lead to the conclusion that individuals without disease or 
ailments ought not to use enhancement practices. Just as Boorse (1975, 1977) 
states that an abnormality of function does not necessitate treatment, 
normality of function ought not to be the only basis for denial of treatment. 
Throughout the main chapters of this dissertation, I examine arguments that 
utilize a functionalist account of health and disease, like Boorse’s account, to 
draw conclusions about treatment and enhancement. I then argue that 
functionalist accounts exclude individuals from medical intervention who 




 In the next section, I canvass several accounts of just health care that 
employ Boorse’s functionalist account of health and disease to distinguish 
between health and disease. The treatment/enhancement distinction is 
understood differently in different theories of justice, depending on the 
conclusions they are used to draw. 
 For example, Daniels’ (1985, 2001) account of just health care is defined 
in terms of providing care that affords individuals the greatest opportunity to 
experience the normal opportunity range for the society in which they live 
over an ordinary life span (Daniels’ account of normal opportunity range 
includes the necessity for social goods such as education, food, and adequate 
housing, and other goods; although I mention this aspect of Daniels’ account, 
my priority is the contribution that health care makes to normal opportunity 
range). 
 Daniels’ account of just health care relies heavily on accounts of 
normality when understanding the normal opportunity range as a basis for 
resource distribution. In the discussion that follows, I also include a 
prioritarian account of just health care that takes justice in distribution to 
begin with the worst off.  Important versions of this account also rely on 
accounts of disease, health, and normal functioning to make decisions about 
how to justly distribute resources.  These are only two of the nonutilitarian 
accounts in the literature; however, they are prominent, frequently cited 
accounts of how health care institutions and personnel ought to treat 
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individuals. In addition, important versions of the accounts make central use 
of the treatment/enhancement distinction, my target in this dissertation. 
 
Daniels’ Account of Justice in “Just Health Care” 
 In his well-known account of “Just Health Care” (1985), Norman 
Daniels utilizes Boorse’s account of disease and health to draw conclusions 
about what justice requires in health care. Daniels’ account of just health 
care relies on the idea that there is a normal range of opportunities for 
individuals in a given society. The normal range of opportunities consists of 
those opportunities, or life plans, that are available to individuals with 
ordinary talents (Daniels, 1985). 
 Health care is a special kind of good because of its potential to support 
or hinder our range of opportunities. Institutions that provide adequate and 
efficient health care can keep individuals healthy and can treat us when we 
are unhealthy. Since health is necessary for many of life’s activities, health 
care institutions and their resources are desirable; however, on occasion the 
demand for these resources outweigh the supply of these resources. According 
to Daniels (1985), because of health care’s special relationship with our 
opportunities, we are required to find a way to justly distribute its limited 
resources to individuals. These resources include interventions, goods, and 
the personnel that provide these goods and interventions. 
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 Daniels (1985) continues his argument with a functionalist account of 
how health care institutions can protect our normal range of opportunities. 
Health care institutions can protect our normal range of opportunities by 
maintaining or restoring a normal level of species-typical functioning. 
Species-typical functioning is a range of bodily functioning that is thought to 
be normal among humans and by which the normality or abnormality of 
functioning of individuals can be judged. 
 Relying on the concept of species-typical functioning allows us to 
determine what justice in health care requires, which is ensuring a normal 
range of opportunity for species-typical functioning individuals. Not all 
opportunities are available to each of us. Key characteristics of a particular 
society will influence what opportunities are available as different societies 
have different ranges of opportunities based on their resources. In Daniels’ 
(1985b) view, the principles of justice that regulate a society’s basic 
institutions also affect available opportunities (1985b). Factors such as 
education and wealth are also factors that can limit opportunities. Disease is 
another factor that can limit the range of opportunities that are open to 
particular individuals given their skills and talents (Daniels 1985b). Health 
care institutions, however, can limit the effects that disease has on these 
opportunities. Again, this is why health care is special and requires accounts 
of what individuals ought to use its resources and how they are to use them. 
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 Daniels’ (1985, 1985b) initial accounts of just health care include the 
idea that disease threatens opportunity, so as a matter of justice, health care 
ought to rectify the ways in which disease hinders access to the normal range 
of opportunities for some individuals (Daniels 1985b). Daniels (1985b) is 
careful to note that his account is not based on leveling up or down—he is not 
advocating that we attempt to equalize everyone’s abilities or opportunities. 
Instead, Daniels (1985b) states that his account of just health care is that 
everyone’s opportunities should equally not be adversely affected by disease 
when disease can be corrected. Ultimately, Daniels (1985b) concludes that if 
it is a matter of justice to maintain equality of opportunity, then equality of 
opportunity, as a principle of justice, must govern the very institutions whose 
distribution of resources affect our opportunities, which includes health care 
institutions. 
 The idea that health care is special because of its effects on our 
opportunities, defined in terms of species-typical functioning, spans both 
Daniels’ earlier (ca. 1985) and later accounts of just health care. Daniels’ 
later accounts of justice in health care, however, expand on this idea and 
create an account of just health care that is more inclusive in what it 
requires. In what follows, I use the example of genetic enhancement to 
demonstrate the evolution of Daniels’ account of just health care. 
 In “Just Health Care” (1985), Daniels utilizes Boorse’s functionalist 
account of disease and health to state that as a matter of justice, the primary 
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duty of health care institutions is to maintain or restore individuals to 
species-typical functioning and to ameliorate disease in so far as it causes 
individuals to deviate from normal functioning, which in turn limits their 
opportunities. Natural inequalities that do not adversely impact our species-
typical functioning, however, are beyond the scope of health care institutions’ 
duties. 
 For example, as a requirement of justice health care, institutions 
would be required to ameliorate congenital brain disorders, such as 
megalencephaly, a condition in which individuals have an abnormally 
enlarged brain. For some individuals, it is a genetic disorder that can lessen 
intellectual capabilities. Although some individuals with megalencephaly 
may not have severely limited intellectual capabilities, if those intellectual 
capabilities are below normal species-typical functioning, then they ought to 
be ameliorated by health care’s resources to the extent possible. If individuals 
with megalencephaly have intellectual capabilities that are lessened but not 
below normal species-typical functioning, however, then health care 
institutions are not obligated to intervene. This may be the case when 
individuals with megalencephaly have a fairly good memory, but do not have 
an exceptional memory that many other individuals desire and indeed may 
have. It is normal species functioning to have an average memory and it is 
beyond normal species functioning to have an exceptional memory; therefore, 
it is not the responsibility of health care institutions to restore or maintain 
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exceptional memory skills. Next, I place this example within the context of 
Daniels’ more recent accounts of just health care. 
 
Daniels’ Account of Justice in “From Chance to Choice” 
 “From Chance to Choice” (Buchanan et al., 2001) adopts Daniels’ idea 
that as a matter of justice, health care institutions should remedy the ways 
in which disease hinders opportunities, in which disease is defined in terms 
of abnormal species-typical functioning. As many diseases have a known 
genetic component, health care institutions must be concerned with genetic 
intervention as well. Genetic intervention is a means to ameliorate disease 
and therefore a means to ensure individuals’ normal range of opportunities. 
New technology that allows us to genetically alter human life forces us to 
expand the types of ethical questions that we must ask concerning genetic 
intervention. Concerns associated with genetic intervention also include the 
problem of natural inequalities.  
 Buchanan and others (2001) canvass different responses to whether 
natural inequalities ought to be altered as a concern of justice, including the 
equality of opportunity view endorsed by Daniels and an egalitarian view. 
They ultimately endorse a moderate view that encompasses aspects of both 
equality of opportunity views and egalitarian views that converge to create 
the idea of a “genetic decent minimum.” Their account of just health care does 
not include the strict elimination of all natural inequalities. Rather, their 
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account of just health care, with the idea of “genetic decent minimum” 
requires that we use genetic intervention to ameliorate disease and to 
ameliorate severe disabilities that adversely affect our normal range of 
opportunities. Additionally, if there are genetic conditions that are not 
considered diseases, yet adversely affect the ability to enjoy the normal range 
of opportunities, then genetic intervention for practices other than 
therapeutic intervention is an acceptable use of health care’s resources. 
 Referring back to the example of megalencephaly, Daniels’ later 
accounts of just health care offer a different justification for medical 
intervention. Based on an opportunities approach, individuals with 
megalencephaly who are functioning below normal species-typical 
functioning ought to be treated by health care institutions. For example, 
genetic intervention is acceptable because abnormal functioning is a threat to 
individuals’ with megalencephaly ability to live the kinds of lives that they 
want to live. In the instance that individuals with megalencephaly have only 
a fairly good memory, then genetic enhancement is permissible within 
Daniels’ account of just health care presented in “From Chance to Choice” 
(Buchanan et al., 2001). Daniels’ later accounts of just health care are thus 
much more inclusive than the earlier accounts. This means that more 
instances of genetic intervention are acceptable and that in some instances, 
health care’s resources may be used to raise individuals beyond normal 
functioning. This use of health care’s resources is justified, based on the idea 
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that abnormal functioning limits opportunities that the individual would 
otherwise have if it were not for disease. 
 This section is not meant to be an exegesis of Daniels’ account of just 
health care, although it does give us a starting point for how Daniels’ 
extensive work deals with the treatment/enhancement distinction. Next, I 
give a synopsis of how the treatment/enhancement distinction functions in 
Daniels’ account of just health care. 
 
Daniels on the Treatment/Enhancement Distinction  
 One of Daniels’ requirements for a proper theory of just health care is 
that it must distinguish between more important and less important health 
care services (2001). Daniels meets this requirement by utilizing the 
treatment/enhancement distinction in both his early and later accounts of 
just health care. 
 Treatment is typically thought of as medical intervention meant to 
maintain, improve, or restore health or prevent conditions not conducive to 
health, with health considered to be species-typical functioning. 
Enhancement is typically thought to be medical intervention used to improve 
health beyond species-typical functioning (Daniels, 2000). A notable 
difference between Daniels’ earlier and later accounts of just health care is 
that in the later accounts, Daniels presents a much less stringent account of 
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the treatment/enhancement distinction and its role in addressing the 
distribution of medical interventions.  
 In earlier accounts of just health care, Daniels prioritizes treatment 
before enhancement because treating medical conditions that cause an 
individual to deviate from species-typical functioning is not conducive to 
equal opportunities (1985). In the instance of enhancement, however, 
typically individuals have already achieved species-typical functioning and 
already have access to a normal range of opportunities. In more recent 
accounts of just health care, however, Daniels (2000, 2001) admits that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction understood as species-typical functioning 
matches at best incompletely with achievement of the normal opportunity 
range. If the focus is opportunity, health care personnel may not provide 
some treatment practices and it may provide some enhancement practices. 
This part of Daniels’ account of the treatment/enhancement distinction aligns 
with his claim that sometimes we are obligated to use health care services to 
change how skills and talents are distributed. Considering medical 
intervention to be treatment is not a sufficient condition for that intervention 
to be provided by health care personnel since the needs of individuals surpass 
medicine’s resources. Disease may be the primary reason to treat individuals; 
however, there are reasons to offer nontherapeutic or enhancement services 
including for purposes such as ensuring opportunities. Daniels gives the 
example of nontherapeutic abortion. This intervention is not provided on the 
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basis that it will improve individual functioning, but it may be necessary, to 
safeguard women’s rights. Thus, Daniels concludes that in the name of just 
health care, health care institutions may provide abortions, a nontherapeutic 
intervention, to women (Daniels 2000, 2001). 
 According to Daniels’ (Buchanan et. al, 2000; Daniels 1985, 2000) 
account of just health care, the treatment/enhancement distinction can only 
play a limited role in health care decisions. If treating some diseases can take 
priority over some enhancements, according to Daniel’s account of just health 
care, yet there are some instances when health care personnel are obligated 
to provide enhancement practices and not treatment practices, then this 
implies that there are some instances when individuals seeking enhancement 
should have the same consideration as individuals seeking treatment. 
Drawing further conclusions from Daniels’ (1985, 2000) account of just health 
care, maintaining species-typical functioning for the sake of maintaining 
equality of opportunity, health care personnel may be required to offer some 
medical intervention that may be considered enhancement. For instance, 
health care personnel may be required to provide growth hormone therapy 
for short-statured children who have a normal functioning endocrine system 
and whose short stature is not the result of disease if short stature affects 
their range of opportunities (see Chapter 3). Next, I examine an alternative 





 The view that I focus on in this dissertation is the view endorsed by 
Richard Arneson (2000) called “responsibility-catering prioritarianism” 
(prioritarianism). Prioritarianism, as a matter of justice, distributes 
resources by prioritizing the wellbeing of individuals that are the least well 
off over individuals that are better off. Wellbeing can be defined in terms of 
general wellbeing, economic wellbeing and/or access to resources (Arneson 
2010). 
 Prioritarianism has been criticized for being a leveling down principle 
that sets the unattainable goal of strict equality. Putting an analysis of the 
criticisms aside, it will suffice for my purposes here to say that in response to 
the criticisms like the leveling down criticism, prioritarians have adopted an 
equality of opportunity account of justice; the goal is not equality of outcomes 
but rather that individuals have an equal opportunity to obtain desirable 
resources or that we have fair shares of total resources (Anderson, 1999). 
Next, I apply prioritarians’ response to leveling down objections within the 
context of justly distributing medical resources. 
 Richard Arneson (2000, 2010) is an example of a prioritarian who 
prioritizes the worst off when distributing resources; however, prioritizing 
the worst off requires us to identify who is the worst off. One of the many 
ways to determine the worst off and subsequently who ought to have access 
to resources is to determine who has a disease and who does not. For 
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instance, mitigating the effects of disease is a concern for prioritarians when 
disease depletes wellbeing (Arneson, 2010). If having a disease makes 
someone more worse off than someone who does not have a disease, then it 
would follow that according to a prioritarian that utilizes the typical view of 
the treatment/enhancement distinction, priority is given to individuals who 
use health care’s resources to mitigate the effects of disease, or for treatment 
purposes. Individuals who use health care’s resources to mitigate the effects 
of unwanted conditions that are not diseases, say rhinoplasty for an 
undiseased distorted nose, are prioritized after individuals seeking 
treatment. 
 If prioritarians needed another way to determine the worst off, they 
could take a queue from luck egalitarians and concede that there is a 
distinction between instances when we are culpable for the disadvantages 
spurred by disease, option luck, and instances when we are not culpable for 
the disadvantages spurred by disease, brute luck. A prioritarian advocating 
this argument, such as Arneson (2010), may state that individuals who are 
not culpable for their disease and thus their disadvantages are more worst off 
then individuals who are culpable for their disease and thus their 
disadvantages, giving the former priority to medical resources. This would be 
like saying that individuals disadvantaged by congenital disorders are 
prioritized before individuals disadvantaged by their choice to partake in 
intravenous drug use or choosing to smoke cigarettes (assuming that these 
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are our decisions to make). 
 One way to determine the requirements of justice within a prioritarian 
account of distributive justice is to utilize the treatment/enhancement 
distinction. However, Shlomi Segall (2010) gives an example of a prioritarian 
account of distributive justice in health care that does not rely on the 
treatment/enhancement distinction. On his view, medical intervention is 
considered to be just when conditions are unwanted, reasonably unavoidable, 
and disadvantageous, and are the result of social or natural circumstances. 
Although Segall prioritizes the least well off, in Segall’s prioritarian account, 
the least well off are not necessarily always the individuals who use medical 
resources for intervention purposes as an unwanted condition that is not a 
disease can be considered a disadvantage. 
 According to Segall (2010), just health care requires us to treat 
pathologies and deviations from normal species functioning; however, some 
health deficits are not matters of pathologies and are not deviations from 
normal species functioning, yet a system of just health care ought to treat 
these conditions, even if they are considered enhancements. This account of 
just health care requires the moral irrelevance of the treatment/enhancement 
distinction for the sake of ensuring equality. 
 Under Segall’s (2010) account of just health care, individuals seeking 
treatment do not necessarily always take priority over individuals seeking 
enhancement, by virtue of using medical resources for treatment. Rather, 
  
31 
prioritarianism focuses on how disadvantageous conditions and the effects of 
those conditions make individuals the worst off. For example, to demonstrate 
the differences between Segall’s (2010) prioritarian account of justice and 
Daniels’ functionalist account of justice, Segall (2010) employs the commonly 
used example of significantly short-statured children. One child is extremely 
short because she has short parents while another child is extremely short 
because of a growth hormone deficiency. If there are disadvantages 
associated with being extremely short then relying on Segall’s account of 
justice, we ought to treat short children with a disease that causes their short 
stature and children that do not have a disease but are equally short in the 
same manner, all other things being equal (Segall, 2010). 
 This example demonstrates a corollary claim in Segall’s prioritarian 
account, which is that a lack of disease is not always an understood, 
unacceptable use of medical interventions. In the instance that individuals 
are considered the worst off, determined by their poor health, whether they 
are seeking treatment or enhancement is irrelevant to the acceptability of 
intervention. 
 Placing the example of the short -tatured children within Daniels’ 
functionalist account of just health care, the growth hormone deficient child 
is prioritized before the short child who is not growth hormone deficient 
because the former has a disease and the latter does not. Daniels’ account of 
just health care also calls for us to examine whether the condition prohibits 
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individuals’ ability to have a normal range of opportunities (Daniels, 1985). 
So if it were determined that being significantly shorter than the rest of the 
population hinders her normal range of opportunities in ways such as 
limiting career prospects or her limited ability to function in a society that 
does not cater to the extremely short, then the child that is not growth 
hormone deficient would be entitled to growth hormone treatment. If extreme 
short stature, however, does not hinder normal range of opportunities, then 
neither a short child nor a growth hormone deficient child would be entitled 
to treatment on Daniels’ view (2001). As Daniels’ (2001) states, issues of 
distributive justice are judged against the backdrop of the society that 
individuals live in. This means that we have to take into account individuals’ 
ability to experience a normal range of opportunities, like that of the 
extremely short, given the society that they live in. 
 Next, I examine criticisms of arguments that distinguish between 
treatment and enhancement for whatever purpose, whether it is to ensure 
opportunities or to prioritize the least well off. The following criticisms are 
raised by Daniels’ himself and are meant to contribute to the philosophical 







Criticisms of the Treatment/Enhancement Distinction 
 Daniels’ earlier accounts of just health care allow room for the 
treatment/enhancement distinction to have a bigger role in how medical 
resources are allocated, namely that the treatment/enhancement distinction, 
in more instances than not, matches obligatory and nonobligatory 
intervention by health care institutions (1985). Daniels’ later accounts of just 
health care allow room for the treatment/enhancement distinction to have 
less of a role in allocation of medical resources (Daniels, 2000). 
 Daniels raises two objections to the treatment/enhancement distinction 
that are inspired by cases where it is difficult to distinguish between 
treatment and enhancement. The first objection is that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction does not possess the moral significance 
that is often associated with its use. Concerning insurance practices, 
sometimes we are compelled to insure ailments that are not diseases just as 
we are compelled to fund diseases. Subsequently, the treatment/enhancement 
distinction does not always match up perfectly with our moral obligations. 
 The second objection to the treatment/enhancement distinction that 
Daniels (2000) raises is that it is our values that limit the kinds of conditions 
that are considered to be diseases. Furthermore when we inconsistently 
apply these value judgments when distributing resources, distinctions 
between treatment and enhancement seem arbitrary. The 
treatment/enhancement distinction is then not a biological distinction but a 
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distinction between values. Therefore, the treatment/enhancement 
distinction cannot be used to draw moral boundaries because we created the 
values that the treatment/enhancement distinction relies upon.  
 The central concern behind both objections is the moral significance that 
is associated with the treatment/enhancement distinction and the moral 
implications that are drawn from it. To respond to these objections, we have 
to accept that the treatment/enhancement distinction is 1) a normative 
distinction with imperfect application to some cases; 2) it relies on values 
that are often times socially and not always biologically created; and 3) that 
these values, represented as explanations of disease, health, human 
functioning, and normality, are an inescapable consequence of distributing 
limited resources whose supply does not meet the demand for those 
resources. Lastly, when individuals experience the same problematic effects 
of disease, the treatment/enhancement distinction should matter less when 
determining who is entitled to medical intervention. 
 I suspect that this response to the two objections raised by Daniels” 
(2000) may be difficult to accept because it relies on the idea that the second 
objection is not so much as an objection but a reality of any theory of 
distributive justice in health care, not just a reality of the 
treatment/enhancement distinction. My response also relies on the idea that 
the concepts that the treatment/enhancement distinction relies on are 
ultimately normative. These ideas, which are the foundation of my response 
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in this chapter and the foundation of this entire dissertation have to be 
accepted if the treatment/enhancement distinction is an option for an 
appropriate theory of distributive justice in health care. In the next section I 
give an example that illustrates my analysis of the treatment/enhancement 
distinction. 
 
Part 2: Case Study: Surgical Leg Amputation 
 In this section, I present two accounts of an example of a health care 
dilemma. Together, these accounts help to demonstrate that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is not an independent concept. They also 
demonstrate that the treatment/enhancement distinction cannot be used to 
draw conclusions about medical intervention without relying on other 
concepts, such as disease and normality. 
 First is the case of Jane, a young, professional sprinter. Jane is involved 
in a very bad car accident that damages both of her legs. To save her life, 
physicians recommend that she consent to amputating both of her legs. 
Physicians inform Jane that because her legs will be amputated below the 
knee she will be a candidate for prosthetic legs. Taking this into account, 
Jane consents to surgery. After her surgery and some recovery time, Jane is 
fitted with prosthetics. As an athlete for most of her life, Jane looks for a 
sport that she can compete in given her recent leg amputations. She discovers 
a love for distance running and begins to compete in multiple marathons. 
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Although Jane cannot participate in some of the sports that she enjoyed 
before her leg amputation anymore, she enjoys the ability to competitively 
run that her prosthetic legs give her. 
 In the previous example, Jane transitions from normal human 
functioning (e.g., possessing both legs) to abnormal human functioning 
(requiring surgery to remove her legs), and then back to gaining some sense 
of normal capabilities, e.g., being able to walk again by the artificial means of 
prosthetics. Contextually speaking, the practice of leg amputation is a 
therapeutic intervention rather than enhancement because amputating 
Jane’s legs is for the purpose of restoring health and not for the sole purpose 
of being a better running competitor. 
 When determining whether Jane’s medical intervention is an example of 
treatment or enhancement, we have to turn to the concept of normality to 
draw conclusions. Comparing the normality of her functioning before medical 
intervention to the abnormality of her functioning, yet normal capabilities, 
after medical intervention allows us to draw conclusions about the 
acceptability of intervention. For example, before the car accident, Jane 
experienced normal functioning; however, the car accident eliminated this 
functioning. Medical intervention was required to give her some resemblance 
of normal functioning. If we can determine that the car accident was of no 
fault of her own and that not having the ability to walk resulted in less access 
to a normal range of opportunities, then allowing Jane to have prosthetic legs 
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would be acceptable under both prioritarian and opportunity accounts of just 
health care.  
 Consider a second scenario in which Jane is a professional sprinter but 
has never been in a car accident. She has always had an average sprinting 
career but longed to break track records and elevate her career. After reading 
an article about the capabilities of technologically advanced leg prosthetics, 
Jane decides to have her legs amputated so that she can get prosthetics legs 
and use the technology to advance her career. 
 In this example, Jane’s legs are not functioning abnormally, nor is any 
other part of her body, and assumingly her mind, diseased in any relevant 
way. Amputating Jane’s legs is not to ameliorate the results of a traumatic 
injury or to correct functioning that is below normal functioning; rather leg 
amputation is spurred by Jane’s desire to function beyond normal functioning 
and her desire for a better career. Relying on the concept of normality, in this 
scenario medical intervention is likely to be considered enhancement because 
Jane does not have a disease, she is functioning at a species-typical level, and 
amputating her legs is not the result of a significant disadvantageous 
condition. 
 One conclusion to draw from examining both scenarios is that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction cannot stand on its own. In scenarios 
such as ones similar to the case of amputating Jane’s legs, we have to utilize 
accounts of proper human functioning, normality, and disease. This is the 
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case when determining Jane’s level of functioning before and after medical 
intervention and when determining the reasons for medical intervention. For 
example, in the first scenario, based on functionalist accounts of normality, 
amputating Jane’s legs and fitting her for prostheses would be considered 
therapeutic intervention to restore a physical capability—walking— that she 
lost as the result of injury. 
 Together these two examples support the overall goal of this chapter, 
and dissertation—without concepts like normality and disease, the 
treatment/enhancement distinction would be useless to accounts of just 
health care. This includes concerns about who gets to use medical resources, 
for what purposes, and who ought to pay for the use of medical resource. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I presented some of the most common explanations of 
normality, health, disease, and human functioning. I then presented some 
frequently utilized accounts of just health care that rely on these concepts, 
including the treatment/enhancement distinction. Together, the explanations 
of these concepts and accounts of just health care show that the theoretical 
and practical approaches for determining how health care should be 
distributed are complex and consist of a series of intricate and interrelated 
supporting claims. Ultimately, decisions about justice in health care are 
normative and are contingent on normative accounts of the role of health care 
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institutions and their role in treating diseases and maintaining health. 
Concerning the use of the treatment/enhancement distinction, the focus of 
this chapter, we can address concerns about using health care’s resources for 
enhancement practices by acknowledging the limitations of the 
treatment/enhancement distinction and using it as more of a guide to 










JUSTLY DISTRIBUTING RESOURCES: A  





 This chapter uses the common dilemma of determining how to justly 
distribute growth hormone (GH) therapy as a model for how the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is used in judgments about distribution of 
resources. Specifically, this chapter explores arguments that utilize the 
concepts treatment and enhancement to draw ethical distinctions between 
the use of GH therapy for individuals of short stature diagnosed with growth 
hormone deficiency (GHD) and children who do not have GHD, but are of 
height regarded as equally problematic. I focus on children with GHD and 
children with Idiopathic Short Stature (ISS), or children whose severe short 
stature is not the result of GHD, but of an unknown cause. 
Norman Daniels (1985) offers a distributive justice dilemma with the 
frequently cited example of two children of equally severe short stature— one 
child’s short stature is the result of GHD while the other child’s short stature 
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is the result of an unknown cause or is the biological result of having short 
parents. The example is often used to illustrate the basic moral quandary in 
bioethics: “What are (if any) health care institutions’ obligations to the sick 
and to the well?”  The treatment/enhancement distinction is an attempt to 
address this moral quandary. The treatment/enhancement distinction is 
commonly used to argue that health care personnel are only obligated to 
intervene on the behalf of the unwell, making the intervention a therapeutic 
intervention, rather than an enhancement practice. This argument, however, 
leaves out the possibility that individuals who do not meet standards of 
normal functioning may also suffer the effects of severe short stature and can 
benefit from medical intervention.  In this chapter, I will use this basic 
dilemma in bioethics, and the use of the treatment/enhancement distinction 
as a response to this dilemma to address health care institutions’ obligation 
to children with and without GHD. I will also discuss how risks of 
intervention play a factor when using the treatment/enhancement distinction 
to respond to dilemmas. 
I contend that when we are presented with issues of distributive 
justice, the ethical work in these arguments is done by normative 
explanations of common concepts in bioethics. Arguments cannot utilize the 
treatment/enhancement distinction without also utilizing normative 
explanations of the role of health care, disease, health, and proper human 
functioning. These judgments then play an essential role in determining 
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when intervention is considered treatment or enhancement and when 
intervention is permissible. 
The treatment/enhancement distinction does not always perfectly 
distinguish between permissibility and impermissibility of medical 
intervention. As I contend in this chapter, the treatment/enhancement 
distinction only has limited significance for arguments concerning 
distributive justice. This means that considering some uses of GH therapy 
enhancement does not necessarily mean that they are impermissible. 
Therefore, when individuals who are considered to be biologically functioning 
normally experience the same undesirable and disadvantageous effects of a 
condition shared by an individual who is not biologically functioning 
normally, the treatment/enhancement distinction becomes a less than 
appropriate decision-making tool and focus should be transferred to the 
effects of the condition.  
Arguments that disregard the similar height between short-statured, 
GHD individuals and individuals with ISS and instead focus on whether the 
individuals have a disease to determine permissibility of medical intervention 
are typically referred to as diagnosis-based arguments. Diagnosis-based 
arguments also typically state that non-GHD individuals should not undergo 
GH therapy because they do not have a disease, making their use of medical 
intervention enhancement, rather than treatment. 
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A corollary of diagnosis-based arguments is that individuals who are 
thought to be seeking treatment have priority in the distribution of GH 
therapy over individuals thought to be seeking enhancement. A conclusion 
that may be thought to follow from this line of thinking is that individuals 
who seek treatment are allowed first priority at utilizing medical resources 
because their needs are in response to what is considered to be a legitimate 
medical ailment. In contrast, individuals who seek enhancement are 
prioritized after individuals seeking treatment because their needs are 
considered to be non-medically imperative. However, this chapter argues that 
the presence of disease does not always lead to the assumption that the 
individual must be treated and the absence of disease does not always lead to 
the assumption that the individual must not be treated. 
Although the GHD/ISS example concerns treatment and enhancement, 
how we respond to the example has bigger implications for how health care 
institutions maintain justice for individuals seeking enhancement, namely 
individuals with troubling bodily characteristics, but lack a diagnosable 
disability or disease. Using “disease” as a basis for distributive justice is an 
acceptable way to ground arguments for health care’s obligation to treat but 
its use can also unjustly ignore the needs of those seeking enhancement but 
suffer from a disability. This means that in some instances, maintaining 
justice for those seeking enhancement is just as important as maintaining 
justice for those seeking treatment. My goal here is to demonstrate such an 
  
44 
example and how the example can be a guide for how health care can ensure 
justice for those seeking enhancement. 
In Part 1 of this chapter, I give the relevant background information 
about GH and GH therapy. In Part 2, I give examples of diagnosis-based 
arguments that seemingly rely on the treatment/enhancement distinction to 
recommend GH therapy only for children with GHD. I then show how 
“disease” as dysfunction and medicine’s goal of remedying dysfunction are the 
motivating concepts in these arguments, not the “treatment/enhancement 
distinction.”  I conclude by showing how examples comparing GHD and ISS 
represent an unclear case for justice in health care if justice is viewed as 
medicine’s obligation to treat the diseased or disabled and an indirect 
contribution to maintaining fair equality of opportunity. 
 
 Availability of Growth Hormone 
The change in supply of HGH1 from limited amounts of HGH to 
virtually unlimited supplies of synthetic GH identified and modified the 
relevant ethical questions concerning GH therapy. This includes what uses of 
GH therapy are considered treatment and what uses are thought to be 
enhancement. The way we answer these questions has implications for 




GH therapy was first made available after 1956 when it was 
reported that HGH could be extracted from the pituitary glands of 
cadavers (Canadian Medical Association, 1967). When the only method 
of administering GH therapy was to first obtain very small amounts of 
HGH by extracting it from designated donated cadavers (Allen & Fost, 
2003; Carel, 2002; Tanner, 1967; Verweij & Kortmann, 1997), the 
stringent method itself encouraged strict HGH therapy standards and 
limited ethical concerns about who should be able to use HGH therapy. 
The limited supply of HGH supported the belief that only a select group 
of individuals who were thought to need GH to treat predetermined 
medical conditions ought to receive therapy because there was not 
enough to distribute to everyone who might want, need, or benefit from 
GH therapy (Guyda, 1999; Lee, 2006; Verweij & Kortmann, 1997). 
Individuals who were determined to have a genuine need for HGH 
therapy were primarily children whose short stature was the result of a 
disease such as GHD or chronic renal failure and Turner’s syndrome, which 
are non-GHD diseases (Verweij & Kortmann, 1997).3 The claims were that 
these individuals had a disease, defined as bodily dysfunction (Boorse, 1975, 
1976) or deviation from species-typical normal functioning (Daniels, 1985). 
The presence of disease gave them a legitimate claim to scarce medical 




These claims created the grounds for diagnosis-based arguments, 
which exclude most non-GHD individuals from GH therapy. Even though 
some studies suggest that individuals without GHD or other select diseases 
could have the same favorable outcomes of therapy as GHD individuals 
(Tanner, 1967), it was once a common practice to rely on diagnosis-based 
arguments to support reserving the limited supplies of HGH for those with a 
disease. This is still a persistent belief in GH discourse, even though there 
are more recent studies that suggest that non-GHD individuals can also 
experience an increase in adult height as a result of GH therapy (Dahlgren, 
2011; Finkelstein, 2002; Leschek, 2004). 
As supplies of synthetic GH increased the availability of GH, the 
thought was that more individuals could be allowed to utilize GH therapy 
because the argument that limited supplies of GH ought to limit access to GH 
therapy no longer held. Subsequently, the appropriateness of strict standards 
for GH distribution based on diagnosis was called into question (Lee, 2006). 
Now that minimal amounts of HGH were no longer able to support 
limiting HGH therapy to particular individuals, other arguments had to be 
put forth to restrict the use of GH for specified therapeutic uses. As the 
arguments in GH discourse evolved, individuals with ISS or individuals who 
are just shorter than they or their parents want them to be became more 
central to arguments concerning GH therapy. Furthermore, arguments also 
had to evolve and provide other explanations for restricting GH therapy. 
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  GHD, ISS, and the Short Statured 
 Children with ISS are extremely short individuals, whose height is 
below average for their age and sex, within two standard deviations from the 
mean in their relative predicted adult height bracket. For boys, the bracket is 
less than 64 inches and for girls, it is less than 60 inches (Hirsch et al., 2003). 
Yet individuals with ISS  do not have any adverse health conditions that can 
be considered to be the cause of their short stature (Lee, 2006). Through 
testing, ISS children also are shown to have normal levels of growth 
hormone.2 
 Lee (2006) suggests that ISS children may have an underlying 
biological cause of their short stature that is not necessarily a disease. For 
instance, he suggests that among individuals with ISS, there are varying 
degrees of serum concentrations of IGF (insulin-like growth factor), varying 
stages of bone-age delay, and variations in the onset of puberty. Based on 
these variations in biological factors, Lee (2006) concludes that there are 
biological impairments that result in a lack of growth. 
 Chernausek (2011) agrees that in most cases of ISS, there is an 
abnormal GH-insulin-like GH (GH-IGF) axis and suggests using this to 
predict response to GH therapy. If Lee (2006) and Chernausek (2011) are 
correct, then adverse biological mechanisms would be one difference between 
healthy, short children and ISS children. This would also make ISS children 
more similar to GHD children. Instead of using diagnosis to determine who is 
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allowed to receive GH therapy, Lee (2006) suggests using molecular defects in 
growth-related genes to determine acceptability of GH therapy. Lee claims 
that determining who should be allowed to receive therapy is an issue of 
whether short stature is a disease or a spectrum of development. Making this 
determination will determine if GH therapy for ISS is a therapeutic 
intervention for a biological abnormality or an enhancement intervention for 
short stature not caused by a disease. 
  It would seem that ISS individuals have many factors in their favor 
that would end questioning the acceptability of allowing them to have GH 
therapy, including FDA approval of GH therapy for individuals with ISS, 
clinical trials that support the potential benefits of GH therapy, and the wide 
availability of GH.4 Since physicians are the gatekeepers of GH therapy, 
however, and many are still hesitant to suggest GH therapy for their ISS 
individuals, the acceptability of allowing them to receive GH therapy is still 
questioned, making their place in GH discourse one of uncertainty. 
Among physicians and bioethicists, there is lack of agreement about 
the requirements that individuals must satisfy to use GH therapy. Based on 
utilitarian arguments and prioritarian arguments, all individuals of a certain 
extreme short stature should be allowed to have GH therapy regardless of 
their diagnosis or lack of diagnosis because some heights are considered 
disadvantageous and disabling. Others argue that ISS individuals are 
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considered healthy and that GH therapy should be reserved for unhealthy 
individuals. 
 Determining how individuals with ISS fit into GH discourse is more 
ethically challenging when we consider that many ISS children have the 
same extreme short stature and the same projected adult height as many 
GHD children. This is problematic because the acceptability of giving GH 
therapy to individuals with GHD has rarely been questioned, while 
individuals with ISS are commonly excluded from GH therapy. 
 Children with ISS can be in the same height percentile (1st percentile) 
as healthy short, children. Since healthy, short children do not have a disease 
that causes their short stature, healthy, short children and children with ISS 
are usually grouped together as “non-GHD” individuals. This is the case with 
some clinical trials, studies, and articles concerning the ethics of GH therapy. 
On occasion, articles also use the term “healthy, short individuals” to refer to 
both individuals with ISS and healthy, short individuals who have not been 
diagnosed with ISS. In some cases, the interchangeability of these terms is 
appropriate because there can be very little difference between some healthy 
short individuals, and some individuals with ISS. 
 The similarities between some individuals with ISS and some healthy, 
short children encourage ethical questions such as ‘Are there any ethically 
relevant differences between individuals with ISS and healthy, short 
children?’ and ‘If there are ethically relevant differences between individuals 
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with ISS and healthy, short children, do the differences warrant different 
treatment in health care?’  There are some similarities between some 
individuals with ISS and some healthy, short individuals, such as being in 
the 1st percentile of height and the lack of an identifiable disease that causes 
their short stature; however, there are some differences amongst some 
healthy, short individuals and some ISS individuals. The biggest difference 
between these two groups of individuals is the possible biological causes of 
stunted height in individuals with ISS, while healthy, short children are not 
thought to have any biological dysfunction. This difference, however, may not 
be significant enough to withhold GH therapy from normal, short children if 
one believes that individuals with ISS ought to be allowed GH therapy, 
whether they have a biological dysfunction or no biological dysfunction. 
 Some healthy, short children are of short stature because of a 
constitutional growth delay. This means that their growth in height has not 
yet occurred; however, it will occur in the future and their height will 
eventually catch up to the appropriate height for their age and sex. Some 
healthy, short children are significantly taller than ISS children and are 
considered to be of an appropriate height given their age and sex; however, 
their parents are under the assumption that they are too short in general, or 
that they are too short to achieve a particular goal so they seek GH therapy. 
These goals can include becoming a professional athlete or attaining a high-
paying job in the future (Benjamin et al., 1984). 
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 Some arguments conclude that because there is some evidence that 
shorter individuals receive lower salaries than their taller counterparts and 
some empirical evidence that individuals of short stature, regardless of the 
cause of their short stature, experience some decreased level of wellbeing 
(Clemmons, 2010), healthy, short individuals, including normal short 
children, should be allocated GH therapy. Noeker (2011) claims that there is 
some reason to believe that ISS individuals (without biological dysfunction) 
have a lower quality of life. In agreement, Chaplin and others (2011) state 
that individuals with ISS and individuals with GHD can experience 
psychological distress as a result of their short stature, which can be 
remedied by GH therapy. They report that a questionnaire answered by the 
parents of ISS and GHD children from ages 3 to 11 showed psychological 
improvement over a 2-year period (most in as little as 3 months) of GH 
therapy. The psychological improvement most demonstrated in ISS 
individuals was an increase in self-esteem (Chaplin et al., 2011). Noeker and 
Chaplin’s arguments, however, are not the dominant view. 
Most arguments that are a part of GH discourse do not give much 
credit to the empirical evidence that individuals of short stature have a 
decreased level of wellbeing (Guyda,1999). These arguments conclude that 
there is not any direct correlation between wellbeing and height, and that 
even if there were, there are other ways to increase wellbeing besides 
augmenting height using GH therapy. Arguments that follow this structure 
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conclude that non-GHD children should not be allowed GH therapy. When 
drawing this conclusion about non-GHD children, we also have to consider 
that there also is not any direct evidence that GH therapy improves GH 
individuals’ wellbeing (as cited in, Durand-Zaleski, 2011; Lee, 2006). 
 Arguments against giving non-GHD children GH therapy also state 
that it is more difficult to manage parents’ interests in making non-GHD 
children taller by utilizing GH therapy than the parents of GHD children. 
These arguments do not deny that this problem exists in many instances of 
allocating GH therapy to GHD children, but claim that this problem is 
especially hard to identify, manage, and counter if necessary, when children 
are just shorter than what their parents desire (Benjamin et al., 1984). 
 Both of these arguments represent a general concern associated with 
GH therapy. The concern is that since there is not any direct evidence that 
short stature correlates with decreased wellbeing and that it can be difficult 
to manage the expectations of parents with short, non-GHD children, the 
risks associated with using GH therapy to treat nonpathological, short 
children is too great a risk to take. The risks associated with medical 
intervention are especially relevant when children are the potential patients. 
Children are a vulnerable population that can be manipulated and taken 
advantage of if the interests of outside parties are not properly managed. 
This is especially important since children do not consent to medical 
intervention; rather, their parents give consent for them. In some instances, 
  
53 
intervention and the accompanying risks, however, may be worthwhile. The 
treatment/enhancement distinction may be used to distinguish between risks 
that are worthwhile and risks that are not worthwhile; however, to do this, 
arguments that use the treatment/enhancement distinction must also rely on 
other relevant concepts. But the treatment/enhancement distinction may not 
always match perfectly with the distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable risks if it can be determined that both GHD and non-GHD 
experience some of the same downsides of short stature. 
 To sort all the changes that the availability of GH has caused amongst 
the relevant individuals in GH therapy and to determine acceptability, many 
GH standards have been proposed. Some argue for the original standards, 
that GH therapy should only be allowed for individuals with GHD or some 
other short-stature-causing disease (Growth Hormone Research Society, 
2000; Lantos & Siegler, 1989). Others argue that diagnoses should not 
determine acceptability of GH therapy, or that diagnoses should be taken 
into consideration as only one factor among many others when determining 
acceptability of GH therapy (Lee, 2006; Pfeifer, 2011). Although old 
standards may not match the current supply of GH, it has been argued that 
it would be immoral to give GH therapy to anyone who wanted to be taller 
without some restrictions (Allen & Fost, 2003). The next section explores 
questions whose answers hinge on what standards are deemed appropriate 




  When drawing conclusions that do not allow a group of individuals to 
take part in any therapeutic practices, a likely accompanying concern is 
whether those conclusions contribute to inequality. When drawing 
conclusions about who is entitled to GH therapy, those drawing the 
conclusions must also consider whether their GH therapy standards 
contribute to inequality among individuals of short stature. When different 
conclusions are drawn about similar medical conditions, we have to question 
the legitimacy of the criteria used to draw those conclusions. Arguments that 
focus on diagnosis have to question if the presence of disease or the lack 
thereof is a legitimate criterion for GH therapy distribution or whether it is a 
morally arbitrary criterion. Whether treating GHD and non-GHD individuals 
as equals is the proper response to the dilemma of how to fairly distribute GH 
therapy depends on the amount of emphasis we place on diagnosis.  
 Another aspect of the relationship between GH therapy and equality is 
examining how expanding the range of individuals who ought to be allowed 
GH therapy, to include non-GHD individuals will affect equality among the 
general population. First, if the requirements for GH therapy are relaxed, 
making it more widely available, the rich are more likely to have the 
resources to obtain therapy, making them more likely to reap the benefits of 
therapy. Conversely, many poor people will not have the opportunity to 
receive GH therapy because they lack certain resources, namely financial 
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resources. In a sense, this will make the rich, richer. If it is indeed true that 
taller people are more likely to receive high-paying jobs, then making the 
already rich, taller will increase the likelihood that they will have higher 
salaries than their comparatively shorter counterparts who will earn less. 
Second, expanding the type of individuals who are allowed GH therapy may 
raise the highest percentile of height, increasing the gap between people in 
the highest percentile (the tall) and people in the last percentile (the short) 
(Tauer, 1995). Increasing the amount of people who are allowed GH therapy 
will change the standards for who is considered tall and who is considered 
short. 
 Allen and Fost (1990) note that there is another option for examining 
the relationship between GH therapy and equality. GH therapy can be 
viewed as a privilege that is allowed to those who can pay for it but not a 
right or something owed to those who cannot afford it. Proponents of this 
option state that society is not obligated to provide some opportunities to all 
individuals. Society is only obligated to provide people with basic needs like 
food, education, and perhaps basic health care (Allen and Fost, 1990). In this 
instance, GH therapy is more or less seen as an enhancement that certain 
individuals are not entitled to, unlike therapeutic practices. 
 The aim of this section is not to advocate for a particular set of 
requirements that individuals must satisfy to receive GH therapy or to argue 
that medical insurance companies should bear the financial costs of GH 
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therapy or that GH therapy contributes to inequality. This section provides 
context for the arguments that are to follow and what is at stake for the 
individuals whom these arguments affect. The following section discusses 
examples of diagnosis-based arguments, which advocate standards of GH 




 Typically, diagnosis-based arguments reference some point at which 
GH therapy is no longer a therapeutic practice, but an enhancement practice. 
In diagnosis-based arguments, this line is based on the presence of disease. 
Typically, diagnosis-based arguments model the following form: Individuals 
whose short stature is caused by one of the diseases on a specified list, 
including GHD, should be allowed to have GH therapy. When GH therapy is 
used to ameliorate the short stature of these individuals, therapy is 
considered to be treatment and thus permissible. Conversely, individuals 
whose short stature is not caused by a disease, but rather factors like 
genetics or when the cause is unknown, should not be allowed to have GH 
therapy. When GH therapy is used to ameliorate the short stature of these 
individuals therapy is considered to be enhancement and thus impermissible. 
 Another version of diagnosis-based arguments begins with the claim 
that if the goal of medicine is to treat diseases, then medical practices should 
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be used to treat only diseases or at least prioritize treatment of disease. This 
version of diagnosis-based arguments relies on debatable judgments about 
the goals of medicine and the nature of disease to reach its conclusion. 
 In this section, I discuss three diagnosis-based arguments that are 
commonly cited in GH discourse5 whose structure is similar to the 
aforementioned argument model. Through this discussion, I will show how 
bioethicists who offer these arguments utilize a particular explanation of 
disease to withhold GH therapy from individuals with ISS even though their 
arguments are contrary to evidence that shows that individuals with ISS (or 
non-GHD, as I will refer to them) can benefit from GH therapy. 
 
Diagnosis-Based Arguments and Clinical Trials 
 Tanner (1967) reports that both individuals with GHD and ISS can 
experience positive outcomes of HGH therapy. As reported by Tanner (1967), 
in a clinical trial, 10 of 16 children with ISS grew 0.52 times their expected 
height velocity before undergoing HGH therapy but grew 1.92 times their 
expected height velocity during the first year of therapy. Two children in the 
clinical trial with ISS had a poor or very little response to treatment, and 4 
children with ISS developed antibodies, which can be an unforeseen 
consequence to therapy for some children, regardless of GHD or ISS. 
Although the outcomes of therapy for the children with ISS were not as great 
as the children with GHD, the children with ISS still experienced some 
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increase in height after undergoing HGH therapy. This study concluded that 
GHD children can benefit from HGH therapy, in terms of an increase in 
height, while non-GHD children can also benefit from GH therapy. 
 Tanner’s (1967) conclusions were not the dominant view of the time, 
but the idea and the evidence that ISS individuals can benefit from GH 
therapy was a part of the literature. The assumption behind limiting GH 
therapy to GHD children was that these were the only individuals that could 
benefit from GH therapy; however, Tanner’s (1967) study suggested that this 
assumption was false. Most diagnosis-based arguments that were made at 
the onset of GH therapy can only be criticized for not acknowledging that 
there was at least one trial that presented results that were contrary to their 
diagnosis-based arguments, whereas arguments that arose much later in the 
history of GH discourse face a different criticism. Once more trials were 
available that showed individuals with ISS had positive outcomes of GH 
therapy, diagnosis-based arguments that continued to conclude that 
individuals with ISS should not be allowed GH therapy face criticisms for 
making arguments contrary to the evidence.  
 A different argument for limiting GH therapy to children with GHD is 
that only these children—not ISS children—have a disease. However, many 
diagnosis-based arguments made at any point in GH discourse, such as an 




 Mason (1972) argues that GHD children use GH therapy for treatment 
purposes, while non-GHD children use GH therapy for enhancement 
purposes. He supports this argument with the claim that individuals whose 
GHD diagnosis has been proven by thorough testing are the only ones who 
can benefit from GH therapy (Mason 1972); however, if there is some reason 
to believe that diagnosis is not the sole determinant of responsiveness to GH 
therapy, then another option for the basis of Mason’s argument is an 
explanation of disease. Although he does distinguish between uses of GH 
therapy that are for therapeutic purposes and uses of GH therapy that are for 
enhancement purposes, the treatment/enhancement distinction is not the 
basis of his argument. The treatment/enhancement distinction is not a 
candidate for the concept that Mason’s ethical judgments are grounded upon 
because the distinction itself must be grounded in a concept. And in this case, 
that concept is disease. 
Arguably, Mason’s (1972) argument is an example of a diagnosis-based 
argument that relies on the explanation of disease as dysfunction to 
recommend GH therapy for the treatment of short stature for GHD children, 
but not for the enhancement of non-GHD children. He states that to 
determine the failure of growth, a patient must undergo a thyroid test to 
determine if the thyroid is functioning properly. If it is not functioning 
properly, it can cause the pituitary gland to not function properly, meaning it 
will not secrete enough HGH. If this is the diagnosis standard that Mason 
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utilizes for GH therapy, then individuals with GHD whose pituitary gland is 
dysfunctioning are allowed treatment. Conversely, individuals that do not 
have a dysfunctioning thyroid or pituitary gland are not allowed GH therapy, 
including ISS individuals. This would support his claims about treatment 
and enhancement uses of GH therapy better than the idea that GH therapy 
can only benefit individuals with GHD. 
Another option for the basis of Mason’s (1972) claims about treatment 
and enhancement is his claim that a child has to have a suitable internal 
environment and an aversion free external environment, one that will be 
receptive to GH therapy, to benefit from therapy. Mason states that GHD 
children have a suitable internal environment because of their gland 
dysfunction. However, even if Mason’s diagnosis-based argument is grounded 
on individuals’ suitable internal environment, he is still relying on what it 
means for humans to function properly as the basis of his claims about GH 
therapy standards. 
If Mason’s (1972) argument relies on a suitable internal environment, 
he must also consider that this is not the only criterion that determines 
success of GH therapy. Mason seems to acknowledge this when he states 
growth hormone is but one metabolic factor that influences growth in height. 
An adverse internal environment can prevent any child from being 
responsive to GH therapy, whether the individuals have GHD or ISS 
(National Institutes of Health, 1972, Root, 2011). If Mason grounds his 
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argument about treatment and enhancement on the claim that individuals 
must have a suitable internal environment for GH therapy to be effective, 
this standard should not solely apply to ISS children because his argument is 
true of non-GHD and GHD children. 
 
Enhancement Research on non-GHD Children 
Tauer (1994) criticizes the standards that were used by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) to approve clinical trials designed to determine the 
effectiveness of GH therapy on normal (“nondiseased”), short children 
(National Institutes of Health, 1990). She argues that by approving this 
study, the NIH permitted children to participate in clinical research for 
purposes other than health and medical treatment. Tauer’s argument is 
grounded in the claim that short stature is not characterized by improper 
body functioning; therefore, short stature is not a disease (Tauer, 1994). 
Additionally, Tauer (1995) makes the claim that uses of GH therapy for 
treatment purposes are acceptable while uses of GH therapy for 
enhancement purposes are unacceptable. 
 Rather than permit clinical trials for therapeutic purposes, Tauer 
(1994) argues that the standards used to permit the NIH trials lead the way 
for future research on children for purposes other than treatment. Tauer 
(1994) argues that the standards used to permit the clinical trials could be 
used to justify GH research for enhancement purposes, or intervention to 
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alter an undesirable condition because short stature is not a disease. Even 
though Tauer notes that the NIH trials claimed that enhancement 
applications of GH therapy were unintended, she believes the standards used 
to approve this study could justify greater-than-minimal risk research on 
children for purposes of enhancement, regardless of the NIH’s intentions. 
This concern is grounded in children’s inability to give informed consent to 
medical intervention. Nontherapeutic research is quite common; however, 
Tauer’s argument goes beyond concerns about therapeutic vs. non-
therapeutic research. Her concerns are focused on children as a vulnerable 
population and nontherapeutic research that uses this population for the 
sake of enhancement.  
 Tauer’s (1994,1995) argument is an example of a diagnosis-based 
argument. She utilizes children’s diagnoses of disease, or lack thereof to 
make claims about what research practices are considered enhancement, and 
thus unacceptable. Tauer, like Mason (1972) must give the basis of her 
conclusions about treatment and enhancement, thus about acceptable and 
unacceptable research. The treatment/enhancement distinction alone is an 
insufficient option for the basis of her conclusions because the 
treatment/enhancement distinction itself must be grounded in a concept. 
Accordingly, Tauer offers disease as the basis for her criticisms of NIH 
standards that approved enhancement practices. 
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 Tauer (1994, 1995) utilizes an explanation of disease as improper 
function to make a diagnosis-based argument, which separates treatment 
practices from enhancement practices. Tauer (1994) explains enhancement as 
altering an undesirable condition. Tauer’s explanation of enhancement, 
however, does not separate enhancement practices from treatment practices 
as treatment can also be explained as altering an undesirable trait, such as 
the very short stature associated with ISS. Yet according to Tauer, the 
presence of disease in one instance of GH therapy and the lack of disease in 
another instance of GH therapy separates treatment from enhancement, thus 
acceptable medical practices from unacceptable medical practices. 
 I further conclude that Tauer also uses disease to distinguish between 
acceptable risks and unacceptable risks of research practices. Although there 
are almost always some risks associated with most instances of biomedical 
research, those risks are acceptable for therapeutic purposes because there is 
the possibility of ameliorating disease; therefore, it is acceptable for parents 
to consent to research for therapeutic purposes. The risks of research, 
however, are unacceptable when disease is not present because the risks of 
intervention are not taken for the potential medical benefit; therefore, it is 






Medicalizing Short Stature 
As most ethicists that give diagnosis-based arguments, Verweij and 
Kortmann (1997) argue that even if children with ISS are responsive to GH 
therapy, responsiveness does not make GH therapy for ISS morally 
justifiable. GH therapy for ISS is only justifiable if the goal of therapy is to 
reduce the risks of psychological and social problems that may arise from 
short stature, not just to make children taller. This means that GH therapy 
would also have to include mental health therapy. When these conditions—
desire to be taller and mental health therapy— are met, GH therapy is 
treatment. When the goal of GH therapy is just to make children taller, 
Verweij and Kortmann (1997) consider intervention to be enhancement. 
Although Allen and Fost (1990) do not agree with diagnosis-based arguments, 
such as Verweij and Kortmann’s argument, and choose to focus on response 
to intervention rather than diagnosis, Allen and Fost do make a similar 
claim. Allen and Fost state that regardless of the cause of short stature, GH 
therapy may not always be the best response to short stature and more often 
counseling is best. 
 Verweij and Kortmann (1997) give a diagnosis-based argument to 
make the claim that when deciding whether a child with ISS should be given 
GH therapy, the answer is always ‘no.’ According to their argument, ISS is 
not a disease because it does not consist of subfunctioning parts nor does it 
compromise the health of the individual. If the general goal of medicine is to 
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prevent, eliminate, and/or reduce the suffering that accompanies disease, 
then treating ISS with GH therapy is not a goal of medicine. 
Nonetheless, Verweij and Kortmann (1997) recognize that society may 
view short-statured people as abnormal but that the remedy to the social 
effects of short stature is not GH therapy but changing cultural stigmas; 
however, short-statured people may find it more beneficial to seek medical 
and psychological therapy than attempting to change societal views of the 
short. Because it can be a timely endeavor to change societal views of the 
short, parents of short children should not be seen as immoral people if they 
choose not to combat societal stigmas and seek GH therapy for their short 
child. It has been argued that as long as children’s parents have been 
informed of the potential outcomes of therapy, including risks and benefits of 
therapy and the possibility that their children will not respond to therapy, it 
is the parents’ right and responsibility to determine if their child with ISS 
should undergo GH therapy (Benjamin et al., 1984). 
Verweij and Kortmann’s (1997) argument is subject to criticism. First, 
their argument acknowledges the clinical trials that report that children with 
ISS can benefit from GH therapy, but does not believe the evidence justifies 
treatment. With this reasoning, Verweij and Kortmann apply a moral 
standard to ISS that they do not apply to GHD. Responsiveness cannot be a 
criteria used to allow the use of GH therapy by individuals with GHD if it is 
irrelevant to determining acceptability of GH therapy by non-GHD 
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individuals. If, however, there is empirical evidence that shows that ISS can 
be treated with GH therapy, then the presence of disease is just one of many 
possible criterion for allowing or denying therapy.  
Furthermore, if Verweij and Kortmann (1997) utilize evidence as 
support for GH therapy for children with GHD, then the evidence should also 
be used to support GH therapy for children with ISS if it is available. Verweij 
and Kortmann argue that responsiveness should not justify treatment for 
ISS, yet rely on responsiveness to justify treatment for GHD. This is 
especially true if we believe in the reliability of the evidence that shows 
either similar responsiveness to GH therapy by GHD children and non-GHD 
children,6 that some GHD children do not respond to therapy (Coste et al., 
1997), or that many other factors affect whether a child will respond to 
therapy, regardless of GHD or not (Mason, 1972; Root, 2011). 
A second criticism of Verweij and Kortmann’s (1997) argument is 
based on its view of medicine. They do not recommend allowing GH therapy 
for most non-GHD individuals based on their view of medicine and the goals 
of medicine. Although they adopt a general view of medicine’s goals, which is 
to treat diseases, the actual practices of medicine differ greatly from this 
view. Medical practices include ameliorating ailments that are not diseases 
such as treating a deviated septum with rhinoplasty. One conclusion to draw 
is that either medical practices do not live up to the goals of medicine or 
Verweij and Kortmann’s (1997) view of medicine’s goal is just one of many 
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views, as considering a practice enhancement does not mean that it is not a 
part of medicine’s goals. 
 Diagnosis-based arguments, demonstrated by the arguments offered 
by Tauer (1994, 1995), Mason (1972), and Verweij and Kortmann (1997), are 
examples of one type of argument in GH discourse that still persists. The 
basis of their arguments is that some practices are treatment, thus take 
priority over practices that are enhancement.  To make their argument, I 
argue that they rely on the explanation of disease as dysfunction (see 
Chapter 2). 
 Mason (1972), Tauer (1994, 1994), and Verweij and Kortmann (1997) 
all give diagnosis-based arguments that exclude ISS individuals from GH 
therapy, but their arguments do not rely on the treatment/enhancement 
distinction; they rely on the presence of disease. As such, Tauer’s argument 
cannot be criticized on the grounds that it relies on the distinction; however, 
it can be criticized for not acknowledging other accounts of disease and/or it 
can be criticized for deviating from the evidence. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argue that arguments that separate uses of GH 
therapy that are considered to be treatment from uses of GH therapy that are 
considered to be enhancement, otherwise known as diagnosis-based 
arguments, do not outright rely on the treatment/enhancement distinction 
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because the distinction cannot function in arguments without first relying on 
another concept. In the case of diagnosis-based arguments, they rely on an 
explanation of disease as dysfunction to claim that when individuals with 
GHD and individuals with other specified diseases use GH therapy, it is a 
practice of treatment; however, when GH therapy is used by individuals with 
ISS, it is considered enhancement. 
Diagnosis-based arguments can avoid some criticisms if they 
acknowledge that there may be reasons to deny GH therapy to some GHD 
individuals because labeling an ailment a disease is not the sole criterion in 
determining the acceptability of GH therapy. Furthermore, individuals who 
make diagnosis-based arguments have to acknowledge that it does not follow 
that considering an ailment a disease means that those with the disease 
should be treated. This approach acknowledges that there are other criteria 
that should be involved in determining the acceptability of GH therapy, such 
as the height of children’s parents, safety, likelihood of response to treatment, 
costs, the psychological effects of therapy, and the psychological effects of not 
allowing the patient to receive therapy. This approach also allows diagnosis-
based arguments to place some importance on whether individuals who 
desire GH therapy have been diagnosed with GHD or with another disease 
that causes short stature. 
Acknowledging that it may be acceptable to allow some individuals 
with ISS to have GH therapy and unacceptable to not question whether all 
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GHD individuals ought to be allowed GH therapy, arguably, follows one 
notion of justice in which individuals in similar situations are treated in 
similar ways (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001), by utilizing the same 
standards for both types of individuals.  
Carl Elliot (2005) shows how almost any practice that may prima facie 
appear to be enhancement can be explained in such a way that makes the 
practice treatment and vice versa. Giving equal consideration to individuals 
with ISS and GHD also acknowledges that both are seeking some form of 
enhancement. It also acknowledges that the parents of children with ISS are 
not all bad people, unwilling to accept the height that their genes and their 
ancestors’ genes have determined for to their children or that the parents of 
ISS children suffer from excessive greed (Wasserman, 2004). 
Regardless of the approach that is taken to determine the acceptability 
of GH therapy, bioethicists, pathologists, pediatricians, and endocrinologists 
have to remember that children are the ones that have to bear the risks of 
therapy (Benjamin et al., 1984) and the negative outcomes of being denied 
therapy. Therefore, determining whether certain criteria for GH therapy is 
justified in denying ISS children GH therapy should be reevaluated, taking 
into account the clinical trials that report similar outcomes of GH therapy for 
GHD and ISS children. We can argue that society should change its negative 
views about short stature and pay equal salaries to the short and the tall, but 
while society is making the transition to viewing the short-statured in a more 
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positive way, children are the ones who have to remain short and handle the 
social stigma attached to being short.
71 
 
    Endnotes 
 
 
1. Human growth hormone (HGH) is a protein consisting of 191 amino acids 
that is stored and secreted by the pituitary gland. When the pituitary gland 
does not secrete enough HGH or when a patient has another specified 
disease, the result is typically short stature. Other factors such as genetic, 
social, psychological, nutritional, or poor health can also determine height. 
 
2. As of 2011, these diseases are approved for GH therapy by the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration. Other approved diseases include Prader-Willi 
syndrome, small for gestational age, and Noonan’s syndrome (Verweij & 
Kortmann,1997). 
 
3. There is some controversy about the reliability of HGH testing. Many ISS 
and GHD patients are shown to have normal levels of HGH. Because of this, 
scholars like Saenger (2002) have called for better testing methods and 
Gelato and others (1986) have claimed that some testing methods such as 
measuring the amount of HGH released are not reliable methods to 
distinguish ISS from GHD. 
 
4. In part, this idea was adapted from Hardin (2008). 
 
5. This was determined by a literature search of GH therapy discourse. 
 
6. Coste and others (1997) and Saenger (2002) argue that in this clinical trial 
children did not undergo GH therapy for long enough, which made the results 
of this trial inaccurate; however, the children were treated with GH for 3 





























The topics discussed in Part II are an extension of the topics discussed 
in Part I; however, Part II focuses on enhancement—the more controversial 
and less explored side of the treatment/enhancement distinction. 
Controversial topics that surround enhancement include who ought to use 
enhancement practices, how we are to determine what practices are 
enhancement, and whether it necessarily follows that deeming practices 
enhancement also deems them unacceptable. In Part II, I focus on arguments 
that contrast enhancement with treatment. As a part of my analysis of 
enhancement, I examine several justice arguments and their conclusions 
concerning the nature of enhancement and what makes it different than 
treatment. Although I focus on enhancement in Part II, the concerns and 
arguments that are present in Part I are a part of my analysis of 
enhancement in Part II, namely what are acceptable and unacceptable ways 
to treat patients and which patients ought to be given priority in health care. 
 In Part II, I examine the justice arguments that are associated with 
practices that are thought to enhance our mental, intellectual, and physical 
capabilities. Some of the concerns that can be seen throughout Part II include 
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concerns about just distribution of enhancement practices, and the 
advantages and disadvantages conferred to individuals who use enhancement 
practices and how their use of enhancement practices affects individuals who 
do not use enhancement practices. What follows is an examination of these 
concerns, and others, and an examination of how treatment practices evade 
these concerns. I use performance enhancing drugs and cognitive enhancing 












SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT: DIFFERENCES 
 IN PERFORMANCE ENHANCING 




In support of the goals of Part II of this dissertation, this chapter 
examines how drug regulation in sports, and the arguments supporting these 
practices, can inform conclusions concerning regulation practices in 
entertainment. At first glance, these two milieus may appear different, but by 
using the traditional methodologies of applied ethics, I show that 
entertainment and sports are similar in some important ethical respects. 
Considering these similarities, I ask whether arguments used to support drug 
policies in sports can and should be applied to entertainment. Conversely, I 
ask what weaknesses in the arguments for drug regulation in sports are 
revealed when these arguments are applied to a different milieu such as 
entertainment. More broadly construed, this chapter is a further attempt to 
discover what information is contextually important when determining what 
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practices ought to be considered enhancement and the ways in which we 
want enhancement practices to better our lives. 
Most professional sports leagues1 have policies that prohibit athletes 
from using a stipulated list of substances.2 Athletes who violate these policies 
are typically fined or barred from participating in the sport for a period of 
time, or even permanently. Different leagues ban different substances; 
however, most leagues ban what they call performance enhancing drugs, 
including steroids, as well as illicit or illegal drugs, such as cocaine. 
On a rare occasion, a 2008 article in the New York Times detailed the 
use of both types of drugs in a milieu outside of sports that does not ban drug 
use: music and film (Lambert, 2008). Yet no outcry corresponding to the 
distress that greets reports of drug use in sports accompanied this Times 
article. Here, I explore whether arguments offered for regulating drug use in 
sports should also apply to drug use in entertainment. I conclude that at least 
one argument is applicable to both sports and entertainment, and that the 
divergence in current policies is largely indefensible on theoretical grounds. 
Although individual entertainers may be subject to contracts that ban 
them from using certain drugs while working on specific projects, the 
entertainment industry as a whole does not have a uniform banned substance 
policy3 that all entertainers must obey, such as the policies that athletes in 
individual sports leagues must obey. The absence of such a policy to which all 
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entertainers are subject and thus can violate is a possible explanation (among 
others) for the lack of public outrage when entertainers use drugs. 
For instance, Sylvester Stallone, star of many popular action films, is 
among the entertainers who have admitted to using growth hormone (GH), a 
substance on most sports’ list of banned substances (Weise, 2008). Despite his 
confession, his drug use is almost ignored by the media. Stallone is not on the 
front page of the Times; instead, a large picture of Major League Baseball 
(MLB) player Roger Clemens is on the front page, fending off accusations of 
being a drug dealer by a member of Congress in a federal court hearing 
(Wilson, 2008). That there is a uniform banned substance policy in sports to 
which Clemens is subject, but not one in entertainment to which Stallone is 
subject, can help explain the difference in responses to the use of drugs. But 
can these different policies be justified? 
One conclusion to draw from the different policies is that the 
differences between sports and entertainment warrant a banned substance 
policy in the former, but not in the latter. For example, it can be argued that 
sports concerns excellences of human physical achievement in which all 
participants must abide by the same rules, including abstaining from drug 
use, if they want to participate. Following the rules of the game maintains 
the integrity of the process used to attain physical achievement (Maschke, 
2009). In contrast, it can be argued that in entertainment, it is the value of 
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the finished product, whether that be a film or a concert performance, which 
is important, regardless of the means used to create that product. 
Another conclusion to draw, however, is that there are theoretical 
reasons to believe that some of the criticisms applied to the use of drugs in 
sports ought to be taken seriously within the entertainment industry as 
well. I argue that at least one argument offered in favor of regulating drug 
use in sports, namely an ideal of fairness, also supports drug regulation in 
entertainment. I also consider that at least one argument against regulation 
in entertainment, namely that the differences in natural talent amongst 
entertainers create an initial uneven playing field, supports deregulation of 
drugs in sports. I conclude that theoretically the contemporary difference in 
treatment of drugs in sports and entertainment cannot be convincingly 
justified, although it may be explained by the argument that regulation in 
entertainment is not practically implementable. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 sets the stage by defining 
performance enhancing and illicit drugs. It also develops an account of sports 
and entertainment and briefly describes the use of performance enhancing 
drugs in each milieu. Part 2 presents two of the most important and common 
theoretical arguments for regulation in sports and then examines whether 
these arguments for regulation can also be applied to entertainment. I 
conclude by exploring the foreseeable obstacles of regulating drugs in 
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entertainment, yet argue that these obstacles should not prevent 
reevaluation of the status of drug regulation in entertainment. 
 
   Part 1: Setting the Stage 
John Hoberman (2009) uses the term “doping,” a term used by 
regulatory agencies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), to 
refer to the act of taking performance enhancing drugs. Summarizing 
Hoberman’s (2009) definition of “doping,” this chapter defines the use of 
performance enhancing drugs as: 
1) A pharmacological practice with the purpose of maximizing human 
capacity; 
2) A pharmacological practice with the purpose of maximizing the 
capabilities of the mind and body to perform desired actions; or 
3) A pharmacological practice not intended for the sole purpose of 
medical therapy4 but for the purposes included in (1) and (2) above. 
Defined broadly, performance enhancing drugs include substances such as 
steroids and growth hormones that are taken for the purposes mentioned 
above. Although generally not included in sports leagues’ list of banned 
substances, some lists also include clauses that in some circumstances give 
leagues the power to ban over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, such as diuretics and 
laxatives, based on their potentially enhancing effects.5 
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This chapter defines illicit drugs as drugs that are illegal based on 
federal and/or state law as applied to the person in question. Illicit drugs are 
also on sports leagues’ banned substance lists. One possible reason for 
banning illicit drugs is to allow the league to retain and promote 
sportsmanship and fair competition. Typically, these substances are also 
thought to be harmful to those who use them. Another reason is for 
reputation purposes: leagues do not wish to be known to support the careers 
of people engaged in illegal activities, whether these activities are drug use, 
spousal battery, theft, or any other negative or illicit behavior. 
A third reason for banning illicit drugs in sports rest on the contingent 
connection between whether a drug is illicit and whether it improves 
performance (Hoberman, 2009). Some illicit drugs can enhance athletes’ 
performance, while others can have either no effect or a negative effect on 
performance, depending on the type of performance and the circumstances. 
For example, the illicit drug marijuana can enhance an athlete’s 
performance, perhaps by calming her before competition. However, this same 
drug can be detrimental to her competitive edge for this very same reason. 
Thus, league banned substance policies typically cover both performance 
enhancing and illicit drugs. 
In entertainment, as in sports, drugs can fall under any of the relevant 
categories previously mentioned. Some drugs are performance enhancing, 
such as the steroids that sculpt an actor’s body or the weight loss drug that 
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helps an actor to stay extremely thin. Some drugs are illicit and performance 
enhancing, such as the cocaine that enables an actor to remember his lines 
for a stage performance. Some drugs are simply illicit: the alcohol consumed 
by a teenage rock star, or the marijuana enjoyed by bands at festivals. The 
contingency of the relationship between whether a drug is illicit and whether 
it enhances performance is also present in entertainment. Some illicit drugs 
can act as performance enhancing drugs, while others, such as marijuana or 
heroin, will likely be harmful to theatrical or ballet performances. However, 
this is also true of drugs that are normally classified as performance 
enhancing drugs, such as steroids or growth hormones, which may give a 
singer a more muscular body but alter her voice in undesirable ways. 
There are many different types of drugs and many different 
explanations for why drugs may be deemed unacceptable in a particular field. 
This section shows that the contingent relationship between whether a drug 
is illicit and whether it is also performance enhancing in sports and 
entertainment is very complicated and at times can be difficult to navigate. 
The next section provides one of many ways to characterize sports and 
entertainment to help navigate each field’s relationship with drugs. 
 
What Is Sport and What Is Entertainment? 
Most philosophy of sport literature does not give a succinct definition 
of sport, and in fact, warns against doing so (Feezell, 2009; McFee, 2004). 
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Nonetheless, accounts in the literature converge on the following description: 
sports are a subset of game in which skill is necessary to achieve a desired 
goal and the activity has stability (meaning the activity is not a fad). A sport 
must also have a wide following, meaning that the activity is liked, watched, 
and/or played by many people (Feezell, 2009; McFee, 2004). Separating 
playful sports from the more competitive type of sports this chapter is 
concerned with, James Keating, author of one of the earliest pieces on sports 
and sportsmanship, adds that “victory is the telos” of sports (as cited in 
Feezell, 2009), with dedication and success in competition being the means to 
victory.6 
Sometimes drugs can help athletes attain victory. Athletes who use 
drugs typically desire drugs’ ability to provide physical enhancement, 
including increased strength, muscle tone, and stamina. Athletes may also 
take performance enhancing drugs to enhance and prolong their careers; 
however, sometimes the detrimental health effects of performance enhancing 
drugs can prematurely end careers. 
In sports, the preparation and training done before any actual 
competition plays a crucial role in whether athletes will be successful in such 
a performance; this may include the preparatory practice of taking drugs. For 
instance, laxatives and diuretics can allow professional boxers or wrestlers to 
compete in matches by helping them reach a suitable weight for their desired 
weight class. 
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In a scenario of this sort, the preparatory practice of taking drugs, 
although not as controversial as some other uses of performance enhancing 
drugs, helps boxers compete in the actual performance of the sport and gives 
them the opportunity to attain victory. Athletes may also desire performance 
enhancing drugs’ ability to fight off inflammation, which is especially 
appealing to cyclists. Certain performance enhancing, OTC, and illicit drugs 
on banned substance lists can help athletes to be both mentally and 
physically in the position to perform, making “performance” a term that can 
include actions athletes take to prepare for a game and the game itself. 
This definition of performance in sports can also apply to 
entertainment. A succinct definition of the entertainment industry is difficult 
to provide because there are varying views as to what it includes and 
excludes. For the purposes of this chapter, generally film, music, television, 
and staged performances such as theatre and Broadway plays are a part of 
the entertainment industry. “Entertainment” usually refers to any activity 
that brings joy, amusement, and a diversion from life’s daily activities, such 
as playing board games or attending a music concert, while those who 
provide entertainment are entertainers. Using both of these definitions 
together, for the purposes of this paper, the term ‘entertainment industry’ 
includes the collective businesses of film, music, television, and theatre, in 
which entertainers give performances that provide audiences with an 
amusing diversion from mundane or cumbersome daily activities.7 
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Just as drugs can help athletes prepare for performances, drugs can 
also help entertainers prepare for performances. Entertainers and athletes 
who take drugs to enhance their performances, however, each do so seeking a 
different type of enhancement. Entertainers usually take drugs seeking to 
enhance the creative abilities facilitated by the mind, rather than the 
physical abilities of the body, such as the violinist who takes beta-blockers to 
relieve anxiety that may prohibit her from playing her instrument at her 
normal optimal level. Drugs can also provide entertainers with certain 
physical enhancements that athletes also find desirable, such as increased 
muscle tone, which a popular singer may want in preparation for the physical 
demands of a world tour. 
Drugs have the potential to help entertainers prepare for performances 
and attain victory. Yet, unlike athletes, entertainers are not subject to a 
banned substance policy. The only common drug policy that entertainers are 
subject to is the law; however, if drugs can enhance entertainers’ 
performances, just as they can enhance the performance of athletes, then 
perhaps a drug policy other than the law is warranted in entertainment for 
the sake retaining a consistent view of drugs. The next section looks at 
arguments that have been used to support the importance of drug regulation 
and determines if they also support the value of a consistent view of drugs in 
sport and entertainment. 
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  Part 2: Arguments for Regulation 
This section considers two arguments for a banned substance policy in 
sports: fairness in competition and maintaining ideals of human excellence. 
The goal of this section is not to defend these arguments, but to set out how 
the arguments and the pertaining counter-arguments are applied to sports, 
and to consider whether they may be applied to entertainment in a similar 
fashion. 
 
Fairness in Competition 
A common account of fairness in philosophy of sport literature is that it 
requires creating and/or maintaining conditions that ensure every competitor 
has equal opportunity to achieve victory (Loland, 2009). On this very basic 
view, fairness does not require that every athlete have the same natural 
abilities, but it does require a level playing field, when drugs are concerned, 
at the time of competition. What social or other background conditions “un-
level” the playing field is of course subject to dispute. If athletes’ use of 
banned substances is to be judged unfair, however, this can be explained by 
appealing to the idea that drug use is within those conditions that are 
thought to unlevel the playing field. In the following section, I give three 
versions of the argument from fairness, each of which gives descriptions of 
such possible conditions. 
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“Rules of the Game” 
 One way in which an argument from fairness in sports might be 
characterized is in what can be known as the “rules of the game” argument. 
Sports have rules and it is within the confines of those rules that we judge a 
winner and a loser (Donovan, 2009). Subsequently, breaking the rules in 
sports is cheating (Donovan, 2009) that skews the meaning of winning and 
losing and under what conditions athletes can win or lose. Some reasons 
sports have rules include the desire to maintain the integrity of sports, to 
show that the league does not endorse undesirable behavior, and to minimize 
the potential harms drug use can cause both athletes who use drugs and 
athletes who do not use drugs. 
The “rules of the game” argument also concludes that a banned 
substance policy is in place to aid the creation and maintenance of conditions 
that are thought to ensure a level playing field for all athletes (as much as 
can reasonably be expected). This ideal is violated when some athletes 
disobey the policy because clean athletes are cheated out of the opportunity 
for victory (Brown, 2001) under the few conditions that can be made fair. On 
this account, the problem is that some athletes violate a policy that others 
obey, while gaining a competitive advantage by this violation—just as 
baseball players who use corked bats are gaining a competitive advantage 
that is not available to batters using league accepted bats. 
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A banned substance policy is also thought to protect clean athletes 
from possible harm that drug-using athletes can cause, which can come as 
physical harm or from social pressures to participate in harmful activities 
(Schneider, 2009). This policy serves as a tool to protect the health of athletes 
considering drug use by implementing repercussions for drug use, which will 
hopefully dissuade athletes from using potentially harmful performance 
enhancing drugs. 
One criticism of the “rules of the game” argument is that it rests on the 
existence of the banned substance policy in the first place. The “rules of the 
game” argument states that there is a policy against drug use because drugs 
are unfair, and drugs are unfair because there is a policy against drug use; 
however, the argument does not tell us if the policy itself is fair. The 
existence of a banned substance policy cannot be used to justify that policy. 
Indeed, the abolition of a drug policy would create fair conditions by allowing 
any athlete to achieve victory with performance enhancing drugs. However, 
as long as the policy exists, and some athletes choose to obey it and others 
choose not to, sports cannot be a fair competition, regarding drugs.  
This argument shows that there must be another interpretation of the 
argument from fairness that maintains that drug use in sports are unfair, 
regardless of whether there is an actual banned substance policy, an 
argument independent of rules. Before I explore this possible argument, 
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however, I will first apply the “rules of the game” argument—an argument 
from fairness—to entertainment. 
When the “rules of the game” argument is applied to entertainment, it 
is for the most part unconvincing due to the structural and institutional 
differences between entertainment and sports. These differences include the 
fact that entertainers are not a part of a league8 and are more similar to free 
agents in sports than they are similar to athletes in a league; nor are 
entertainers competing for spots on an exclusive team. In entertainment, 
there are not any regulatory bodies,9 and subsequently, there are not any 
rules to break, except in special cases such as singing competitions on 
television. 
One difference between sports and the entertainment industry that 
makes applying the “rules of the game” argument to entertainment 
problematic is that the entertainment industry does not subject entertainers 
to a uniform banned substance policy. The “rules of the game” argument 
cannot apply to entertainment based on this difference. Yet, if one believes 
that the goals and norms of entertainment are similar to those of sports, and 
like sports, drugs jeopardize goals and norms, then these ideas would justify 
a drug regulatory body in entertainment, or perhaps different regulatory 
bodies for different types of entertainment.10 
The “rules of the game” argument states that by means of violating 
rules, drug-using athletes gain an unfair advantage at attaining victory that 
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clean athletes do not have. In sports, these advantages can be measured in 
points on the scoreboard or by cutting time on a stopwatch. Yet, even if there 
were a banned substance policy by which entertainers had to abide in 
entertainment, there is not an objective way to measure advantages that is 
comparable to a stopwatch like that in sports. The number of albums or film 
tickets sold might be an objective measure of success, but the subjective 
nature of tastes and interests that these sales rely on make them an 
unreliable measure of success, thus incomparable to a stopwatch. However, 
according to this argument, if there are not any rules, any advantages drug-
using entertainers gain from drug use are not unfair because there are not 
any rules in place to violate. 
 
“Norms of the Game” 
A second interpretation of the argument from fairness, the version that 
does not appeal to the rules in place in sports, can be called the “norms of the 
game” argument. This argument bases fairness on norms that are 
traditionally a part of sports, norms that spectators would like to see 
maintained, or norms that might be defended as desirable for the sport in 
question. These norms include the idea that athletes who use performance 
enhancing drugs gain an unfair advantage over athletes who do not, an 
advantage that was not the result of hard work (Donovan, 2009; Loland, 
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2009). This argument concludes that norms can determine what is fair even if 
there were not rules in place to safeguard those norms. 
 
“Normal Risks” 
Another interpretation of the argument bases fairness on what is 
considered to be a reasonable and unreasonable risk to ask athletes to take. 
For instance, an athlete who chooses to train for competition for only 4 hours 
a day is taking a reasonable risk when she competes against an athlete who 
chooses to train for 8 hours a day and then subsequently loses the 
competition to the athlete that trained for longer. The athlete who chooses to 
train for 4 hours risks losing the game as well as risks getting injured during 
the game as a result of a lack of preparation. However, the risk of getting 
injured, as a result of being less prepared, is not an extraneous risk—that is, 
a risk that is not within what is reasonably expected to occur in competition. 
In contrast, expecting an athlete to take drugs so she can athletically match 
her opponents who may (or may not) be using performance enhancing drugs 
is not a risk that she can reasonably be expected to take, because the risks 
pose an unreasonable amount of harm to her health and career. 
When one athlete takes or is suspected of taking performance 
enhancing drugs, athletes competing in the same sports will be faced with the 
following decisions: 1) to take drugs, in fear that others are taking drugs, and 
take the health risks that are associated with them; 2) to not take drugs and 
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take the risk of being physically harmed by physically superior, drug-using 
athletes and accept the greater chance of losing because a clean athlete 
cannot physically match a drug-using athlete; or 3) to train extra hard in 
hopes of being a physical match for a drug-using athlete, which is unlikely to 
happen since drugs allow the body to achieve feats that simply cannot be 
achieved by the hard working, unenhanced body. Overall, the clean athlete is 
faced with the decision to either take drugs or likely lose the game. Making 
athletes face this potential lose-lose decision is unreasonable and thus unfair. 
It requires an athlete, who does not desire to take drugs because of the 
degree of unreasonable risks to their health and career that they pose, to take 
a risk, which is unlike the degree of risk associated with a bad training ethic. 
As in sports, it is unreasonable in the entertainment industry to ask 
entertainers who do not want to take drugs to do so, to be suitable 
competitors for drug-using entertainers. Just as in sports, it is unreasonable 
to ask entertainers to jeopardize their health and careers. It may be difficult, 
however, to determine whether entertainers who do not use drugs can match 
the performances of drug-using entertainers, while it is accepted that an 
athlete who does not take drugs simply cannot perform like a drug-using 
athlete. Nonetheless, entertainment, as an industry, may have a sense of 
fairness that can be violated just as sports have a sense of fairness that can 
be violated. 
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For example, let’s say that an actor who wanted to audition for the 
starring role in an action film decided to take steroids to prepare for the 
audition. A second actor wants to audition for the same action hero role. The 
second actor decides to try to make his body look the part by exercising and 
eating nutritious food. When the second actor auditions for the role, he does 
not get the film role because the first actor who auditioned for the same role 
physically looks more like an action hero. Although drugs do not affect the 
acting abilities of either actor in this example, sometimes acting skills matter 
less than if an actor looks the part. 
In this example, drugs helped the first actor to achieve a muscular 
body, which gave him an advantage during the audition. Yet, it would be 
unreasonable to ask the second actor to take drugs just to physically match 
the first actor because of the possible dangers steroids pose to his health and 
career. Arguably it is also unfair that the first actor received the film role 
with drugs because the second actor, who chose not to take drugs, is 
disadvantaged. If entertainment, as an industry, has a sense of fairness in 
which clean entertainers can be disadvantaged by drug-using entertainers, 
then this argument of what are reasonable and unreasonable risks also 
applies to the entertainment industry. Next I give a real-life example of 
performance enhancing drugs in the entertainment industry. 
Sylvester Stallone, a popular film actor known for his roles in action 
movies, may be an example of the above scenario. Stallone has admitted to 
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using GH, and has even advocated its use among older adults for purposes 
such as slowing down the aging process, which is not its intended use (Foley, 
2007, Weise, 2008). If Stallone used GH while preparing for a film role, 
arguably he benefited from the drug’s ability to provide muscles faster than 
an individual could if he were just exercising and lifting weights. Although it 
is difficult to prove that Stallone received a film role due to his enhanced 
physique,11 his GH use was discovered when he was found to be in possession 
of GH at an airport while en route to promote one action film and to begin 
filming another (Foley, 2007, Weise, 2008). This means that it is possible that 
he used GH to receive and subsequently to perform well on films. It is this 
possibility that is potentially unfair. 
Formulated in one of the aforementioned ways, a “norms of the game” 
argument would provide a justification for a banned substance policy in 
sports and entertainment, but requires an explanation of why the advantages 
drug-using athletes receive are unfair. Why, for example, should there be 
rules against drug use when rules are not designed to level the playing field 
for athletes who lack natural physical attributes, such as height (which can 
give an athlete an advantage over an athlete without this natural attribute) 
or for entertainers with a lack of natural talent (which can give an 
entertainer an advantage over another entertainer without this natural 
attribute)? 
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A possible reason for this is that some drugs are either exogenous or 
artificial substances, whereas a person’s height, speed, and talent are 
achieved without the help of such substances. To some, this argument may 
seem arbitrary; however, it is an argument rooted in ways that competition 
can be made fair, or the playing field can be made even. These ways can 
include reliance on natural talents and drug regulation. Similarly, the 
“norms of the game” argument claims that drugs make natural talent, brute 
luck, and genuine hard work, that often times determines a winner and loser 
in a game, unimportant when they should be central to fair and entertaining 
competition. 
Robert J. Donovan (2009) offers a different perspective on the “norms 
of the game” argument and states that even if athletes’ drug use did not 
make the playing field uneven, sports are an uneven playing field without 
drugs. The nature of sports is such that without the use of drugs, competitors 
do not have equal access to victory. Athletes have varied levels of natural 
talent, skill, and financial constraints that create unfair conditions in sports 
by giving the talented, skillful, and rich an advantage over the talent-less, 
skill-less, and poor. Athletes also have varied access to certain technologies 
such as advanced training equipment, aerodynamic clothing, coaching staffs, 
nutritional advice, and other tools that increase the likelihood of victory 
(Donovan, 2009). Because of these inequities, athletic competitions are 
uneven playing fields even without drugs. 
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Donovan’s (2009) argument merely points out how access to victory in 
sports can be affected by actions and conditions other than substances. 
However, it does not tell us if the uneven playing field created by 
performance enhancing drugs should be accepted as an ordinary part of 
sports, just as the uneven playing fields created by varying degrees of natural 
talent are accepted. Donovan’s argument also ignores the fact that superb 
nutritional advice or exceptional coaching staffs are within the rules of 
sports, while the use of performance enhancing drugs are not. This argument 
does not adequately address the fairness issues that are created when drugs 
contribute to an uneven playing field in sports. Donovan’s argument may, 
however, provide information on how arguments that consider the innately 
uneven playing field in sports apply to the entertainment industry. 
Some entertainers have natural abilities to sing or dance, play an 
instrument, or act, while others have to work and train very hard to be good 
singers or actors and still may not be as good as those with natural abilities. 
Some entertainers have access to equipment and coaches who can make them 
appear to be better singers (as in the case of auto tune in music) or actors, 
like athletes who have access to trainers and running coaches. So, at least in 
this sense, the entertainment industry also starts off as an unequal playing 
field; but we would hardly say that a singer with natural talent has an unfair 
advantage over a singer who does not have natural ability to sing. 
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Again, though, acknowledging the presence of innate inequities does 
not tell us if we should prevent the ones created by performance enhancing 
drugs. One clue that we have that tells us that perhaps we should care about 
the inequities created by performance enhancing drugs in sports are the 
presence of rules, including a banned substance policy. If entertainers were 
subject to rules like those to which athletes are subject, rule violation would 
be an argument supporting the unfairness of the advantages obtained 
through drug use, just as it is with athletes; however, since no such policy 
exists in entertainment, this argument supports drug regulation in sports, 
but not in entertainment. 
I have given two versions of the fairness argument, one version that 
applies to only sports—“rules of the game” argument—and one version that 
applies to both sports and entertainment—“norms of the game” argument 
formulated as reasonable and unreasonable risks. Next, I discuss another 
argument that may support drug regulation in sports—human excellence— 
and determine if it supports drug regulation in entertainment. 
 
What Is Human Excellence? 
The ultimate appeal of both versions of the fairness argument hinges 
on the assumption that the goal of sports is victory without drug use. The 
“human excellence” argument, often seen in philosophy of sports literature, 
stems from this assumption. The following discussion considers possible 
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answers to the question ‘what is the goal of sports?’ and whether that goal 
warrants drug regulation. I then apply this same argument to entertainment. 
According to Murray (1983), “the rules of sports are arbitrary in the 
sense that they could be otherwise,” but it can also be argued that the rules 
are not arbitrary. Rules maintain what the community of those who enjoy, 
play, and support a sport value and find “meaningful” about that particular 
sport. This idea suggests that sports have a particular notion about the goals 
of sports and what it means to excel that maintain the values of the sports. 
According to the “human excellence” argument, sports concern the 
achievement of excellence within the specific confines of the sport and 
through efforts to better or master natural abilities, such as the ability to run 
fast or jump high (Murray, 1983). Although performance enhancing drugs 
could be used to master innate abilities, according to this argument, 
performance enhancing drug use is not one of these specific limitations. 
Performance enhancing drugs also cheapen achievement in sports by 
making athletic victories less praiseworthy because the victories were not the 
sole result of hard work. Performance enhancing drugs make athletes 
superior in strength and increase their chance of victory beyond what 
spectators would normally expect from a human being, making them 
abnormal (Brown, 2001). With drugs, sports are no longer about athletes’ 
hard work, but are about how far the human body can be pushed with the 
help of drugs. According to the “human excellence” argument, this is 
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unwanted because it deviates from the accepted norms of the game, which 
include excellence by means of dedication and effort (Brown, 2001). This 
argument maintains that human excellence in sports is the attainment of 
victory through the efforts exerted by the unenhanced body. Because this 
particular idea of human excellence exists in sports, it is argued that drugs 
should be regulated to make sure that its goal is achieved and that the norms 
of sports are upheld. 
The “human excellence” argument, when applied to sports, is 
vulnerable to two criticisms. The first is that most athletes are abnormal 
without the use of drugs, where abnormal means that their bodies are able to 
do things that the average person cannot do. The average person cannot slam 
dunk a basketball or complete a gymnastic routine (Brown, 2001). Similarly, 
most clean entertainers are abnormal by this standard because they are able 
to perform creative tasks, such as acting in movies or performing musical 
concerts for thousands of people, which the average person cannot do. The 
“human excellence” argument does not acknowledge that most athletes are 
abnormal even without the use of drugs. For this reason, this argument has 
limited application to both sports and entertainment.  
Second, this argument also does not take into account that it is only a 
modern idea that human excellence in sports is achievement sans drugs. 
Although the drugs used in sports before the twentieth century were far less 
potent and effective than the performance enhancing drugs that have been 
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available since the 1960s, there are some examples of drug use before the 
1960s that resemble modern drug use (Hoberman, 2009). For example, in 
1894 French sports, physician Phillippe Tissié gave several types of a 
beverage to a cyclist to measure its performance enhancing value on the 
cyclist. It was not until the commercialization of sports that the idea that 
drug use was not in accord with sportsmanship was brought to the forefront 
of public attention (Hoberman, 2009). Next, I consider how the “human 
excellence” argument and its criticisms apply to the entertainment industry. 
In contrast, when this argument is applied to entertainment, it can be 
used to argue that regulating performance enhancing drugs is of no concern 
to the entertainment industry because it has a different view of human 
excellence than that of sports. In the entertainment industry, spectators 
judge whether an entertainer has excelled by the value of the finished 
product; we judge the individual song, film or performance, not the means of 
its creation. It is rarely questioned what means an entertainer used to write 
a good song. This difference between sports and entertainment exists because 
most forms of entertainment’s ideal of human excellence is producing a 
quality product that will be popular amongst spectators, regardless of how 
that quality is achieved. This is especially true of popular music. According to 
this argument, because the process of achieving excellence is of little to no 
importance and the goal of entertainment is not mastery of a craft through 
means of an unenhanced body, the type of drug regulation that exists in 
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sports is not necessary for the entertainment industry. If this is empirically 
true, then the human excellence argument applies to sports, but not to the 
entertainment industry. 
If the examples of centuries of drug use in sports break down the 
argument that human excellence in sports are achievement without drugs, 
then one could argue that performance enhancing drugs should not be 
regulated in sports just as they are currently not regulated in entertainment 
because both spheres would then have the same ideal of human excellence— 
achievement, regardless of the means to achievement. Nonetheless, the 
widely accepted view is that excellence in sport is victory without drugs, so at 
present sports and the entertainment industry do have different ideals of 
human excellence. 
 
    Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how two standard arguments—the 
argument from fairness and the argument from human excellence—are used 
to support banned substance policies in sports while considering some 
criticisms of those arguments. I have also shown how those arguments and 
criticisms apply to the entertainment industry, as it is generally understood. 
These arguments are also discussed in Part I of this dissertation, albeit with 
different types of enhancement, and with different conclusions drawn. When 
contrasting enhancement practices that are used by normally functioning 
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individuals with practices that are used by abnormally functioning 
individuals (now considered treatment), we have to consider who is 
disadvantaged or who is treated unfairly. In Part I, I conclude that some 
times the individuals who are unfairly treated are the normal functioning 
individuals who use medical intervention for enhancement. However, the 
issue of fairness changes when it is applied to sports and entertainment, 
namely that individuals who use performance enhancement practices can 
greatly disadvantage normal functioning individuals. 
Both sports and entertainment have a sense of fairness that can be 
violated suggesting the appropriateness of drug regulation in both arenas. 
However, if one takes seriously the claim that sports are inherently unfair 
due to natural talents, this suggests that the absence of drug regulation in 
sports could be a way to level the playing field. This may be similar to the 
idea that growth hormone therapy could be one way to level the playing field 
if we take seriously the claim that short statured individuals are 
disadvantaged in the work force, as discussed in Part I of this dissertation. 
However, the issue of leveling the playing field to make competition fair in 
both sports, entertainment, and growth hormone therapy faces the issue of 
raising the bar of what is considered normal or adequate will change the 
standards for what is considered normal or adequate for everyone involved, 
normal or abnormal functioning. Subsequently, what was once considered 
normal will now be considered abnormal and the group of individuals who are 
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now abnormal will have to be raised to a new, higher level of functioning. 
This in turn, could exponentially change what is normal. 
One conclusion that both Part 1 and Part 2 share is that enhancement 
practices are typically considered acceptable when used by individuals who 
are functioning abnormally; however, because of issues of fairness in 
competition, some therapeutic drugs are banned and therefore unacceptable. 
This means that the treatment/enhancement distinction does not perfectly 
match with a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable, as argued 
throughout both Parts I and II of this dissertation. 
This chapter does not argue for one particular idea of sports or the 
entertainment industry; however, it does offer some idea of what components 
make up each sphere, including what human excellence means in each 
milieu. Sports and entertainment differ in their contrasting ideals of what it 
means to excel, suggesting the appropriateness of drug regulation in the 
former but not in the latter. Two different conclusions might be drawn from 
this discussion: that sports ought to reevaluate banned substance policies, or 
that the entertainment industry ought to consider establishing drug policies 
similar to those that exist in sports. 
By examining the drug regulatory arguments’ application to sports, I 
conclude that these arguments also have varying degrees of application to 
entertainment, despite drugs’ ability to enhance performance in each sphere. 
Nonetheless, there are practical issues that will most likely never lead to the 
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creation of a banned substance policy or a drug regulatory agency, like the 
IOC, for entertainment. These practical issues also highlight the inherent 
differences between sports and entertainment. 
 If one were convinced that the theoretical arguments for drug 
regulation in sports warrant regulation in entertainment, several obstacles 
would stand in the way of putting regulation into practice. For instance, it 
would have to be determined who would be responsible for enforcing a 
banned substance policy. Sports have various regulatory agencies such as the 
IOC, World Anti-Doping Association (WADA), and the United States Anti-
Doping Association (USADA), but currently no such organization exists in 
entertainment. Would the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) take on the role of 
regulating drugs for actors? It would also have to be determined who would 
be subject to drug testing. Musicians, dancers, and actors are not the only 
performers in the entertainment industry, unlike athletes who are the only 
performers in sports. Also, entertainers travel much more than athletes and 
the entertainment industry encompasses many kinds of performances (staged 
performances, appearing on talk shows, photo shoots, etc.), making evading 
drug tests easy, but making it hard to create realistic and enforceable 
repercussions for positive tests. 
The obstacles in the application of drug regulatory policies in 
entertainment show that it would be difficult to create a banned substance 
policy, and test and punish accordingly. However, these obstacles do not 
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invalidate the theoretical arguments that support regulation in 
entertainment. If entertainment and sports are indeed similar in the ways I 
propose, then the status of drug regulation in entertainment and in sports, 
whether that is to regulate or deregulate drugs, should at the least be 
reevaluated. The different treatment of drugs in entertainment and sports 
cannot be justified based on the grounds of obstacles of regulating drugs in 
entertainment. Rather, the obstacles only explain why a banned substance 
policy is currently not in place in entertainment and why it would be difficult 
to implement such a policy in the future. 
Not regulating drugs in entertainment gives a drug “pass” to 
entertainers that is not given to athletes who may be in a similar profession. 
If it is true that the performances of athletes and entertainers can be 
enhanced by performance enhancing drugs, then drug regulation in sports, 
but not in entertainment, is an example of inconsistent drug regulation. 
Theoretically, arguments against drug regulation in entertainment and 
arguments for regulation in sports should be taken seriously in both spheres 
for the sake of retaining a consistent view of performance enhancing drugs.
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    Endnotes 
 
 
1. Only professional athletes in professional sports leagues such as Major 
League Baseball (MLB) and National Football League (NFL) will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
2. For example, in Major League Baseball (MLB), the Health Policy Advisory 
Committee (HPAC) is responsible for education about drug use, testing 
protocols, and similar activities according to the league’s banned substance 
policy. The policy prohibits eight, Schedule II and Schedule I substances 
including but not limited to cocaine, LSD, opiates, and marijuana. The non-
exhaustive list also prohibits forty-five Schedule III steroids, and anabolic 
androgenic steroids that are not covered by the Schedule III classification. 
 
3. This use and subsequent uses of “banned substance policies” refers to their 
role in drug regulation. 
 
4. A person may take some drugs for the sole purpose of medical therapy, yet 
they may have enhancing effects for the user. In cases like these, one must 
appeal to the league’s banned substance policy, which will either allow or 
disallow a person to take the drugs. Some leagues allow athletes to appeal to 
the regulatory body that governs their sports if they need to use a drug for 
therapeutic purposes but it is banned in their sports for its enhancing 
abilities. If the appeal is denied, athletes may be prevented from receiving 
the genuine therapeutic benefits of a drug but they must forgo these benefits 
if they wish to take part in professional sports that require its players to obey 
a banned substance policy. 
 
5. Furthermore, activities such as training schedules, laser eye surgery, strict 
dieting practices, practicing at places of high altitudes, sleeping in hyperbaric 
chambers, and other similar practices, may be considered “enhancement” 
practices, or include partaking in enhancing substances, but because they are 
not substances themselves, they will not be considered in this chapter. 
 
6. There are some exceptions, such as the Special Olympics, in which victory 
is not the telos of the sports. 
 
7. This definition could include pornography, which is a type of film, middle 
school orchestra concerts, which are a type of music, and other instances of 
film, music, and theater not specifically mentioned in this chapter. Instances 
such as these are excluded from my discussion of entertainment as they are 
either not respected forms of entertainment or not professional. 
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8. An entity that is currently present in entertainment that is the most 
similar to a sport’s league is the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), although it is 
very different from a sport’s league. The main difference is that an 
entertainer does not have to be a SAG member to be an entertainer, whereas 
an athlete must be a part of a league to play professional sports. 
 
9. The Screen Actors Guild does not have an official policy on drug use. 
 
10. The only common drug policy that entertainers and athletes are subject to 
is the law, which has its own set of repercussions. 
 
11. It is possible that his acting abilities (which I doubt), or his fame and 













COGNITIVE ENHANCING PRACTICES: 
 






 A recent New York Times article concerning the prescription of 
psychopharmaceuticals to nonpathological children is representative of an 
increasingly common occurrence in which issues in bioethics seep into 
popular culture. This article reports that a Georgia (USA) physician 
intentionally, falsely diagnoses his school-age patients with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) if the patients are performing poorly in school 
and are a part of a low-income family. These false diagnoses allow him to 
prescribe psychopharmaceuticals like Ritalin or Adderall to his patients to 
help modify their behavior and cognition to facilitate academic success in 
financially struggling schools (Schwarz, 2012). 
 This New York Times article raises many theoretical and practical 
issues concerning just enhancement practices that are at the forefront of this 
dissertation. Some of the relevant issues include fair distribution of 
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enhancement practices, the place of nonpathological individuals in 
enhancement discourse, and the role of the treatment/enhancement 
distinction in distributive justice arguments. Throughout this chapter, I 
revisit the New York Times article to aid my analysis of these concerns 
within the context of cognitive enhancing practices, practices that are meant 
to improve individuals’ mental capacities. 
  In this chapter, I canvass several objections to cognitive enhancing 
practices, including objections that utilize the treatment/enhancement 
distinction to draw conclusions about the unacceptability of distributing 
psychopharmaceuticals to normally functioning individuals. In the case that 
these objections also apply to other types of enhancement practices that are 
discussed in this dissertation, I will give an analysis of how the objections 
either change or do not change when applied to these other enhancement 
practices. 
 Anders Sandberg (2011) has suggested that these types of concerns 
may only be cultural, social, or political concerns, rather than ethical 
concerns. When responses to theoretical and practical concerns are used to 
permit and withhold access to cognitive enhancing practices, however, these 
concerns become ethical issues that can influence access to opportunity and 
influence our ability to live the kind of lives that we desire to live. In this 
chapter, I also explore how cognitive enhancing practices’ affect our lives and 
the kinds of opportunities that cognitive enhancing practices can create.  
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Biological and Nonbiological Dilemmas 
 Cognitive enhancements are practices that aim to amplify or improve 
the mind’s capabilities (Juth, 2011). These capabilities can include, but are 
not limited to the ability to better process information (Sandberg, 2011), 
recall information, have longer attention spans, and improve planning and 
problem solving skills (Housden, 2011). Cognitive enhancement practices 
such as memory exercises aim to improve cognitive skills by means of 
improving our cognitive abilities— not our biology. Cognitive enhancing 
practices such as psychopharmaceuticals, noninvasive brain stimulation 
(NIBS), and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) aim to improve our 
skills by means of improving cognition or mood at a biological level. 
 Whether cognitive enhancing practices improve cognition and how they 
improve cognition—biologically or not—is often seen as relevant to their 
acceptability for normally functioning individuals. The relevance of the 
biological or nonbiological nature of cognitive enhancing practices is a source 
of contention that other enhancement practices also face. The argument 
typically follows this model: Enhancement practices that biologically improve 
our capabilities are less acceptable when used by normally functioning 
individuals, but more acceptable when used by abnormally functioning 
individuals.  Next, I use psychopharmaceuticals to illustrate this dilemma 
and the relevant justice questions, including questions about acceptability. 
 Psychopharmaceuticals, drugs that alter specific psychological 
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capacities (Farah, 2004), cannot directly affect cognition; rather, they 
improve cognition by targeting neurotransmitters and neurons in the brain 
that control cognition. Most psychopharmaceuticals target specific abilities 
such as focus or memory retention (Housden, 2011). There is some compelling 
evidence to support the effects on cognition by psychopharmaceuticals, such 
as Adderall, Ritalin, and Cymbalta (Murray, 2006; Sandberg, 2011; Wolpe, 
2002). Other more common drugs such as caffeine and nicotine are typically 
used as stimulants that temporarily and minimally improve cognitive 
abilities. Some college professors, students of all ages (but primarily college 
age students), and pilots (among many other professionals) have all been 
known to use these cognitive enhancing drugs to improve alertness, improve 
abilities to retain information, and sift through large amounts of information 
and discard the irrelevant information (Sandberg, 2011). 
 Some drugs can potentially offer individuals great cognitive effects, but 
their uses as cognitive enhancers are still considered experimental. For 
example, the drug Propranolol, a beta-blocker commonly used to treat 
hypertension, is a potential neurocognitive enhancement that is still 
considered to be in the testing phase, but shows promising benefits to 
cognition. Propranolol has been the focus of studies that hope to show that 
the drug can benefit individuals who have experienced traumatic events but 
have yet to develop PTSD by preventing the onset of PTSD and its 
debilitating effects. For these individuals, Propranolol may be able to lessen, 
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or even completely erase, the memory, and/or emotions associated with 
traumatic events (Henry, 2007; Kolber, 2011; Levy, 2009).  
 Using Propranolol to treat symptoms of PTSD before an individual is 
diagnosed with the disorder is similar to using vaccinations in that using 
Propranolol is a preventive measure.  Just as vaccinations can be viewed as 
treatment or enhancement practices, so can cognitive enhancing practices. 
However, as a goal of this dissertation is to show that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction has minimal importance to issues of 
distributive justice, as evidenced by the accepted and encouraged use of 
vaccinations, the treatment/enhancement distinction has little relevance to 
the acceptability of vaccinations. 
 Similar to the use of vaccinations, the treatment/enhancement 
distinction has little relevance to the acceptability of cognitive enhancing 
practices. Instead explanations of health and how they are utilized by 
accounts of just health care, as discussed in Chapter 2, have more impact on 
determining acceptability of cognitive enhancing practices such as the use of 
Propranolol. For example, preventing disease or adverse physical and mental 
conditions is a typically acceptable use of medical resources.  If using 
Propranolol to prevent PTSD is considered a therapeutic practice then under 
an account of just health, such as Daniels’ (1985, 2001) account, Propranolol 
would be an acceptable preventive measure for individuals showing 
symptoms of PTSD. If using Propranolol to prevent PTSD is considered 
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enhancing a mental state, Propranolol would still be a preventive-therapeutic 
measure and in accounts of just health care, like Daniels’ (1985, 2001), that 
Propranolol maintains health makes it acceptable. 
 If future research were to show that Propranolol could prevent the 
effects of bad memories in individuals who do not show signs of PTSD, then 
the treatment/enhancement distinction as well as the concepts that the 
conceptual distinction relies on may be more relevant to determining 
acceptability of using Propranolol. 
 
Fast and Easy Remedies 
 The drug Adderall is commonly at the forefront of concerns about quick 
and easy remedies to abnormal cognitive functioning and its associated 
hardships. Adderall, nicknamed the “smart drug,” is a schedule II drug that 
combines amphetamines and dextroamphetamines to treat ADHD. When a 
patient experiences low social or academic functioning due to inattentiveness, 
poor memory, being easily distracted, difficulty with staying quiet or staying 
still, and/or other similar impairments, and a physician attributes these 
symptoms to ADHD, she may prescribe Adderall as a therapeutic measure 
(Adderall, 2012; Adderall and Smart Drugs, 2011) to remedy these symptoms. 
 Adderall, like most drugs, has some risks and side effects, including 
dependency, aggressive behavior, and strokes, among other conditions, but it 
is still a widely popular drug among individuals diagnosed with ADHD. 
 113  
These risks are typically viewed as worthwhile when individuals have 
ADHD.  These risks are typically viewed as not worthwhile, however, when 
Adderall is used by individuals who do not have ADHD, but desire the effects 
on cognition that the drug can offer (Schwarz, 2012). Although Adderall may 
remedy symptoms associated with ADHD, it is not meant to directly remedy 
the conditions associated with poor cognitive functioning of individuals with 
or without ADHD. 
 A commonly cited criticism of cognitive enhancement practices is that 
biological cognitive enhancement is an easy or quick fix. According to this 
argument, biological enhancement is a solution to a problem that requires a 
much bigger, and perhaps altogether different, solution. In a sense, biological 
enhancement is a small bandage for a massive wound. For example, referring 
back to the New York Times article mentioned at the opening of this chapter, 
Dr. Michael Anderson prescribes Adderall to his elementary school age 
patients with poor academic performance. Anderson himself admits that 
Adderall is not a prescription for ADHD but a prescription for the bigger 
problem of poor academic performance in schools that are ill-equipped to help 
struggling students (Schwarz, 2012). 
 If individuals have ADHD, Adderall is meant to treat the symptoms 
that may impede their academic success, not to directly treat their poor 
academic performance per se. When individuals do not have ADHD and 
subsequently do not have symptoms associated with Adderall, the drug can 
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be thought of as treating poor academic performance, low income, or a 
financially struggling school and all the ills that are associated with schools 
that do not have enough money to accomplish their goals. And as there is no 
drug that is meant to treat these kinds of things, Adderall, in the instance of 
no diagnosis of ADHD, is intended to treat social injustices that cause poor 
academic performance. Dr. Anderson himself admits that prescribing 
Adderall to non-ADHD kids is an inexpensive fix for a nonmedical problem. 
As he puts it, society cannot or will not modify a struggling child’s 
environment to make it more conducive to her success, so prescribing 
Aderrall is his way of fixing the child so that she can successfully function in 
the less than desirable environment that she is required to function within 
(Schwarz, 2012). 
 In cases such as that of Dr. Anderson, Adderall is a tool of social 
justice. Adderall is used to tip the success scales in favor of those that do not 
have the means to succeed and as an aide when no one is actively working to 
diminish the impediments to their success. Adderall then becomes an 
instrument of righting the wrongs created by misdistribution of wealth and 
the effects of that poor distribution, including inadequate schools, low-paying 
jobs, and poor health care. A simple mixture of amphetamines, 
dextroamphetamines, and sugar cannot right these social injustices; or so 
this common argument against biological cognitive enhancement advocates. 
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 According to criticisms of actions such as those committed by Dr. 
Anderson, cognitive enhancements such as Adderall are a quick fix to a very 
big problem, and as such, not a treatment for the real problem but a surface-
level treatment (Sandberg, 2011). Social injustices that contribute to poor 
academic success are the real issue in instances of individuals who are not 
diagnosed with a cognitive or intellectual disorder but are given drugs to help 
them succeed. Thus, remedies to social injustices are also options for 
rectifying poor academic performance. This solution also avoids falsely 
diagnosing individuals with intellectual or cognitive impairments in which 
there is no evidence to support such a diagnosis. 
 Sandberg (2011) gives an example of a utilitarian account of using 
drugs for enhancement purposes. According to this argument, our social 
environment requires us to have a higher-than-normal level of cognition that 
previously was not required of us to adequately function in society. He 
focuses on the societal, career, family, and personal demands that individuals 
face. These demands have created the desirability and need for cognitive 
enhancing drug use by individuals without cognitive or intellectual 
impairments as both face escalating demands on their time and cognitive 
skills. Cognitive enhancement practices allow us to meet these demands and 
thrive in a society that requires more focus, better memory retention, and 
other improved cognitive skills. 
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 Continuing the utilitarian account of cognitive enhancing practices, 
practices such as taking drugs or even NIBS can be viewed as quick, yet 
feasible solutions to complex problems. When considering whether it is more 
prudent to change individuals or society we have to consider the benefits of 
changing the individual rather than changing society (Sandberg & Savulescu, 
2011). There may be some reason to prefer social changes to individual 
changes, including safety and likelihood of success, but there might be some 
reason to prefer biological changes to an individual rather than social 
changes. These reasons include the idea that it is much harder to change 
society. It is easier to change an individual’s financial and social situation by 
giving her drugs than it is to implement social change that improves an 
individual’s financial and social situation. 
 It is also a timely endeavor to create social change. When the demands 
are current, a solution that is also current is often times more desirable than 
a solution that may take decades to implement; so long that the individual in 
question does not get to experience the benefits of social change. Thirdly, it is 
also a financially costly endeavor to create social change when compared to 
the price of a drug. In the instance that the benefits of biological cognitive 
enhancement practices outweigh the benefits of social change, we have to 
consider utilizing cognitive enhancement practices (Sandberg & Savulescu, 
2011). 
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 Although cognitive enhancement may be desirable as an immediate 
and cost-effective fix for cognitive impairments, the risks associated with 
cognitive enhancement practices when used by cognitively normal individuals 
must be taken into consideration. The risks associated with cognitive 
enhancement practices are real for all individuals, but those when risks are 
taken for nontherapeutic purposes, the acceptability of risks diminishes. 
 Another concern that accompanies the use of cognitive enhancements 
is the concern that people may feel pressured or coerced to use cognitive 
enhancing drugs if other people are using drugs (Housden et al., 2011). 
Inevitably, if a large group of people start to use drugs, the baseline of normal 
functioning will be raised, making those who were once functioning at a 
normal level, now functioning at a level that is below normal. In efforts to 
keep up with high-functioning individuals, more people may feel it necessary 
to take cognitive enhancing drugs to remain normal. Like concerns about 
risks of intervention, concerns about social pressures also concern normal 
and abnormally functioning individuals. Next, I give an account of just health 




 The outcomes of cognitive enhancing drug use, including what tasks 
cognitive enhancing drugs can be used to accomplish and how successful drug 
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use is for accomplishing tasks, is the focus of utilitarian accounts of cognitive 
enhancing drug use. Whether drug use is for the purpose of treating the 
ailments of abnormally functioning individuals or enhancing the capabilities 
of normally functioning individuals does not reflect the acceptability of 
intervention within utilitarian accounts of cognitive enhancing drug use. 
Accordingly, normally functioning individuals and abnormally functioning 
individuals are both given some consideration for the use of medical 
interventions. This conclusion is shared with prioritarian accounts of 
cognitive enhancing drug use, although the justification is different. 
 Both normally functioning and abnormally functioning individuals are 
given consideration for medical intervention under the prioritarian account 
because prioritarianism prioritizes the least well off. Based on this idea, it 
would be within the parameters of prioritarianism for some normally 
functioning individuals to use cognitive enhancing practices for strictly 
enhancement purposes if they were considered the least well off whether 
financially least well off or least well off in regards to resources or wellbeing. 
Normally functioning individuals who are at a disadvantage because of their 
normal level of cognitive or intellectual capabilities would be allowed to use 
enhancement practices for treatment purposes if that disadvantage were to 
make them the least well off. In instances like this, when applications of 
prioritarianism disregard the treatment/enhancement distinction, 
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determining who is the least well off and in what ways they are the least well 
off determines what justice requires. 
 It may be particularly difficult to determine if normally functioning 
individuals are the least well off based on mental and intellectual capacities, 
although it may be easier to determine if some abnormally functioning 
individuals are disadvantaged. Referring back to the example of using 
Adderall to improve cognitive capabilities, if there was an instance when two 
individuals wanted to work for a high pressured, fast-paced software design 
company and one individual was disadvantaged by her diminished cognition 
and there was another individual that wanted to work for the company who 
was disadvantaged by his normal cognition, both the normally and 
abnormally functioning individual may be entitled to Adderall within a 
prioritarian (sans treatment/enhancement distinction) account of just health 
care. To determine which individual would be distributed Adderall, we would 
have to determine which individual is the least well off. Richard Arneson 
(2010) states that a theory of justice that prioritizes the least well off has to 
consider individuals’ advantages and disadvantages, as well as individuals’ 
capabilities when determining who is the least well off. In addition to taking 
into account individuals’ disadvantages and capabilities (Arneson, 2010), we 
also have to consider their financial status, and their access to medical 
resources. To determine who ought to be distributed Adderall to help them 
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successfully complete their work tasks, we would have to take into account 
each individual’s capabilities and their economic wellbeing. 
 The point is that there are accounts of distributive justice in health 
care that can give normally functioning individuals at least some 
consideration when allocating resources. As the accounts maintain, normal 
human functioning is not always an understood unacceptable use of medical 
resources and abnormal functioning is not always an understood acceptable 
use of medical resources. However, if we were to apply the 
treatment/enhancement distinction to a prioritarian account, we would still 
have to determine who is the least well off and in what ways they are the 
least well off. Additionally, we would have to determine if their 
disadvantages are the result of their choices. Therefore, adding the 
treatment/enhancement distinction to prioritarianism accounts of 
distributive justice adds more determinants of justice in health care. 
 
Discussion 
 Enhancement practices are those practices that improve upon genes or 
environmental factors or a combination of both genetic and environmental 
factors to give us better mental or physical capabilities.  For example, we can 
manipulate genes that have been identified as being responsible for memory 
capabilities (Sade, 1998) or we can increase our memory capabilities by using 
memory exercises and games.  Typically, genetic enhancement is much more 
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ethically controversial than nongenetic enhancement practices, especially in 
the case of normally functioning individuals.  Sandberg and Savulescu (2011) 
suggest that as we learn more about unconventional cognitive enhancement 
practices genetic enhancement practices may become a common and accepted 
practice of human improvements. 
 The practice of cognitive enhancement, either biologically or non-
biologically, is meant to improve our cognitive capabilities, which can 
translate into an increase in the quality and sometimes quantity of life by 
giving us capabilities that we may not otherwise possess. These capabilities 
can then translate into opportunities; opportunities that if taken advantage 
of, can further improve our lives. These opportunities can include access to 
prestige, education, jobs, and financial wealth. For example, Sandberg and 
Savulescu (2011) state that cognition can be thought of as a capital good, 
meaning that increasing cognition can increase our potential capital earning 
capabilities. An increase in cognition can then mean an increase in general 
intelligence and that there is some link between job performance and general 
intelligence. And better job performance can mean significant financial gains. 
Sandberg and Savulescu (2011) note cognition’s potential as a capital good to 
reinforce the idea that enhancing cognition has personal benefits to 
individuals. They also note that the personal benefits of enhancing education, 
even if it is by means of cognitive enhancement practices, can positively 
impact society by reducing social costs. This means that cognitively 
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enhancing individuals can also benefit society as a whole and not just benefit 
the individual. 
 Enhancement practices are only as good the advantages they confer on 
individuals. And because of the potential enticing benefits of enhancement 
practices, when determining possible responses to theoretical questions that 
can have practical application, as a matter of justice as fairness, we must 
balance the interests of normally functioning individuals that seek 
enhancement practices and abnormally functioning individuals that also seek 
enhancement practices. We have to look at the justifications for our reasons 
for withholding cognitive enhancement practices from individuals who are 
considered to be functioning normally, especially when doing so could mean 
withholding opportunities. We also have to consider whether the benefits of 
drugs make them a more viable option than social change or whether social 
change is a more formidable goal. 
  
Identity, Personhood, and Authenticity 
 If the mind is the gatekeeper of our identity, then when determining if 
there are relevant differences between biological and nonbiologically 
cognitive enhancement practices, we must consider cognitive enhancement 
practices’ impact on identity. In Kamm’s (1993) influential book “Listening to 
Prozac” he documents personal testimonies of individuals who took the drug 
Prozac and then reported that they felt more like themselves, as if they had 
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shed their shy, inverted personality for a more vibrant, and truer personality. 
This demonstrates one view of cognitive enhancement practices—they force 
us to consider our personhood (Wolpe 2002). Cognitive enhancement practices 
force us to consider what makes us who we are and who we want to be. If 
cognition makes us who we are and helps us to be the kind of person that we 
want to be, we have to examine how changing cognition also changes the 
person that we are and the changes the kind of person that we hope to 
become. 
 It is typical to question how brain disease or injury will affect our 
cognitive functioning and in turn how disease or injury will affect our 
identity. If the mind’s reduced functioning can be said to significantly change 
an individual, so much so that she can be thought of as being a different 
person as in the case of a person with Alzheimer’s disease, then we have to 
consider if augmenting cognition can also be thought of as changing an 
individual’s identity (Wolpe, 2002). With the case of Alzheimer’s disease, 
people have decreased cognitive functioning and may lose interests in 
activities that once brought them pleasure and may forget people that were 
once significant parts of their lives. In the case of enhanced cognition, it is 
plausible that interests may also change as cognitive capabilities changes.
 The foundation of concerns about how identity changes with any form 
of cognitive enhancing practices is a concern for retaining or creating an 
authentic self. Carl Elliott (2005) states that authenticity is an ideal to strive 
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for because authenticity is a means to being complete and fully ourselves 
through the process of self-discovery and self-fulfillment. In The Ethics of 
Authenticity, Charles Taylor (1991) describes authenticity as seeking self-
fulfillment. Furthermore, authenticity becomes a quest for individualism. 
Taylor describes individualism as the idea that we have the right to shape 
our lives based on those ideals that we determine to have meaning and value. 
Additionally, this right to shape our lives imparts a duty to discover what it 
means to be true to ourselves and then we are called to follow through 
(Taylor, 1991). 
 Authenticity, as an ideal to be achieved, also includes the idea that if 
we do not discover our desires, our talents, and abilities, we are not getting 
the most out of our lives— we are not living out life to its fullest potential. 
The goal is to be who we are meant to be and if we were to fail in our 
attempts to accomplish this goal, we would not be true to who we are meant 
to be and subsequently we would be a fraud. Therefore, an authentic life 
becomes a higher life, a life that has achieved its goal of being uniquely itself 
(Elliott, 2005). 
 Elliott (2005) states that surgical enhancement can be a means of 
changing an individual’s outer appearance to match her inner being, as in the 
case of gender reassignment surgery for a man who believes that his inner 
being is a woman. Similarly, Elliott gives narratives of individuals who had 
face-lifts, started antidepressant regimens, or participated in voice change 
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exercises to rid themselves of their undesirable southern accents and then 
began to feel like their true selves. When the idea of “discovering our true 
selves” is applied to cognitive enhancement, biological and nonbiological 
cognitive enhancement practices, such as taking psychopharmaceuticals, can 
be thought of changing cognition so that our outward appearance, or our 
personality, matches our inner being. Similarly, Elliott (2005) states that it 
may be appropriate to say that drugs have brought out our true self as these 
drugs reveal hidden parts of our personality that otherwise, to the detriment 
of our sense of authenticity, would have remained hidden. 
 
Discussion 
 Cognitive enhancement practices can change aspects of ourselves that 
are essential to who we are. They can change who we are and who we desire 
to be. Taking this into consideration, when determining the relevant 
differences between cognitive enhancement at the biological level and 
cognitive enhancement that does not affect biology, we have to evaluate each 
enhancement practice based on the extent to which it can affect our ability to 
be the individual that we want to be. Some enhancement practices have the 
capability to affect cognition more than others, meaning their capability to 
change who we are and who we may become is greater. The differences 
between some cognitive enhancements can be compared to the differences 
between an athlete that takes synthetic testosterone to build muscle and 
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enhance his athletic performance and an athlete that wears clothing 
engineered for better athletic performance.  
 Judgments about the acceptability of better clothing options and drugs 
in professional sports typically focus on what is fair for competitors. 
Arguably, drugs are banned from sport because of the degree to which they 
can enhance performance, whereas some engineered clothing and shoes are 
not banned from sport because of the minimal advantage they can confer onto 
athletes (although some engineered clothing and shoes are banned from sport 
competitions). As the argument goes, the athlete who uses drugs has a 
greater chance of attaining victory than the athlete that does not use drugs. 
Conversely, the athlete that wears engineered clothing or shoes does not have 
an extreme advantage over athletes that do not wear engineered clothing or 
shoes. This argument attempts to maintain a sense of fairness, which in this 
instance can be viewed as equal opportunity to victory, or as much equal 
opportunity that can be secured by rules and regulations (see Chapter 4). 
 When this argument is applied to cognitive enhancing drugs and 
cognitive enhancement practices such as memory exercises, we can look at 
individuals as competitors for social goods such as jobs and education and 
just as athletes can be viewed as competitors for victory. Although the rules 
to life’s success are not written and enforced like rules in sports there is some 
sense of what is fair in ensuring access to opportunity. If the idea behind 
regulation in sport is to ensure access to victory, then regulation of cognitive 
 127  
enhancement practices can also be thought to have the same goal. Regulating 
who can have access to cognitive enhancing drugs such as Ritalin and 
Adderall can affect who has more of a chance of attaining good grades in 
school, admittance into universities, or access to jobs. The one major 
difference between access to victory in sports and access to social goods is 
that although social goods may be limited there can be more than one winner 
of those goods, unlike most professional sports in which there is only one 
winner. 
 When considering who ought to have access to cognitive enhancement 
practices and if there are relevant differences between biological and non-
biological cognitive enhancement practices, we have to consider the 
advantages that can accompany the enhancement practices and whether 
regulation encourages or discourages fairness in access to those advantages. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I contend that individuals who are functioning 
normally are relevant to cognitive enhancement discourse because of the 
promise of elevated intellectual capabilities and the benefits to identity and 
social goods that cognitive enhancement practices can offer. Cognitive 
enhancement practices, whether biological or non biological, have the 
capability to confer social and financial advantages onto the individuals who 
participate in the practices.  
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 It can be argued that the societal pressures create the irresistible nature 
of cognitive enhancements. As jobs become scarce, they also become 
increasingly competitive. Similarly, admittance into top universities is 
becoming increasingly competitive. With individuals competing for jobs and 
chances at higher education, practices that can give individuals an edge over 
their competition are tempting and difficult to resist. My goal is not to make 
the argument that a high-pressured society entitles individuals to cognitive 
enhancement practices; however, because of the benefits of cognitive 
enhancements, if we withhold cognitive enhancements from a particular 
group, we must justify these actions. 
 Just as physical enhancements can be tempting to athletes of varying 
abilities, cognitive enhancements can be irresistible to those suffering from 
cognitive and/or intellectual disabilities as well as those who are thought to 
have normal cognitive functioning and intellectual capabilities. It has been 
argued that the environment that athletes find themselves in contributes to 
their desire for physical enhancement. In fact, some have argued that the 
environment of sports and the demands placed on athletes entitles them to 
physical enhancements (Schneider, 2009). 
 This chapter highlights the issues of how to treat normally functioning 
individuals when we have the biotechnology to end the ways in which 
individuals suffer from their natural shortcomings. This chapter explores this 
issue within the context of cognitive enhancing drugs, while Part I of this 
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dissertation explores this issue in the context of growth hormone therapy and 
how the treatment/enhancement distinction influences how we view these 
issues. One running theme in this dissertation that is prevalent in this 
chapter is that the treatment/enhancement does not always match up 
perfectly with acceptable and unacceptable uses of medical intervention. This 
chapter approaches the issue by drawing the conclusion that based on the 
ways that cognitive enhancement practices can enhance our lives and the 
relatively low risks of adverse health associated with some cognitive 
enhancing drugs, cognitive enhancing drugs are not only acceptable as 
therapeutic practices, but that some uses of cognitive enhancing practices by 
















 This dissertation is a response to incorrect uses of the 
treatment/enhancement distinction. A widely held belief is that 
distinguishing treatment from enhancement is a matter of definition. The 
conclusion then may be drawn that medicine appropriately responds to 
circumstances in which treatment is necessary and that health care policies, 
such as funding decisions, should reflect this approach. Mistakenly, the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is employed as an objective distinction 
between medical intervention that is medically necessary and medical 
intervention that is medically unnecessary. Although the 
treatment/enhancement distinction can be employed in this way, the 
normativity of the distinction must also be acknowledged if the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is to serve as a somewhat useful tool in 
arguments of distributive justice. 
 Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction is much more complex than definitions 
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and policies. Based on the ethical implications of health care decisions, such 
as the potential to unjustifiably withhold medical intervention from some 
individuals, the applicability of the treatment/enhancement distinction 
should be recognized as more complex than definitions and policies based on 
those definitions. When deciding who is not allowed to have use of medical 
resources, health care personnel owe individuals thoughtful justification for 
policies on the allocation of medical resources. 
 In this dissertation, I contend that a part of acknowledging the 
normative nature of the treatment/enhancement distinction is acknowledging 
that arguments that utilize the treatment/enhancement distinction, a 
conceptual distinction between medical practices that are considered 
treatment and medical practices that are considered enhancement, rely on 
explanations of concepts such as normality human functioning, health, or 
disease to draw conclusions about medical intervention. Given this 
contention, I examine the treatment/enhancement distinction within the 
context of growth hormone therapy, cognitive enhancement practices, and 
performance enhancing drugs. 
 
Arguments 
 In this section, I review the arguments that I examine throughout this 
dissertation to draw my conclusions about the normative concepts on which 
the treatment/enhancement distinction relies. I contend that proponents of 
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enhancement practices have to address these arguments. Additionally, I 





 Showing concern for normally functioning individuals and questioning 
the understood entitlement to enhancement practices for the abnormally 
functioning individuals is not an egalitarian agenda. Showing concern for 
normally functioning individuals is not an attempt to equalize everyone’s 
talents. Justice in health care does not require that everyone’s talents be 
equalized; however, it does require nonarbitrary and justified policies for 
withholding enhancement practices, and thus their benefits, from certain 
individuals. This is especially necessary when enhancement practices are 
concerned because of the potential economic and professional opportunities 
they can confer upon individuals. Therefore, if certain practices are not 
available to normal individuals by virtue of those practices being viewed as 
enhancement practices, then as a matter of justice in health care, we must 
explain our reasoning for withholding these practices.  
 Buchanan and others (2000) state that not all inequalities ought to be 
a concern of distributive justice in the case that we do not have the 
biotechnology to enhance individuals’ minds and bodies. However, now that 
we have the means to modestly enhance our being and promising 
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biotechnology to significantly enhance our being, at the minimum, we have to 
reconsider our treatment of natural inequalities in a scheme of just 
distribution of enhancement. A reconsideration of just how we ought to treat 
natural inequalities in terms of distributing enhancements is necessary 
because we have the opportunity to remedy certain inequalities and 
eliminate the ways in which we are hindered by those inequalities. If we can 
eliminate or even lessen the ways that our natural inequalities affect our 
lives then we can become better competitors for opportunities. 
 Traditionally, the viewpoint is that it is acceptable for abnormally 
functioning individuals to use enhancement practices in an attempt to raise 
themselves to levels of normality. However, improperly balancing the 
interests of normal and abnormally functioning individuals poses the biggest 
threat to justice for the normally functioning individuals who seek 
enhancement. Taking it for granted that normally functioning individuals are 
not entitled to enhancement practices and that abnormally functioning 
individuals are entitled to enhancement practices also poses a problem for at 
least maintaining equal consideration of normally functioning individuals. 
 
Social and Professional Environments 
 The nature of particular social and professional settings is another 
argument that can be seen throughout this dissertation. For example, in 
Chapter 4, I acknowledge the argument that the evolution of professional 
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sports encourages performance enhancing drug use. Professional sports 
involve sponsors, the sale of merchandise, spectators’ increasing expectations 
of sportsmanship and entertainment, and increasing financial gains with 
victories. As a result of these components of professional sports, some 
athletes have claimed that the nature of sports requires drug use. As the 
argument continues, sports require human abilities that individuals can only 
acquire with the help of performance enhancing drugs (Donovan 2011). 
 This argument can also be seen in Chapter 5. Concerning cognitive 
enhancing drugs, I also acknowledge the argument that the increasingly 
competitive nature of college admissions and jobs and the increasing 
demands on our time create an environment that makes normal and 
abnormally functioning individuals susceptible to the promises of cognitive 
enhancing drugs. 
 
Acceptable and Unacceptable Risks 
 There are risks associated with almost all uses of medical practices. 
When examining proper and improper uses of enhancement practices, we also 
have to discuss the risks that these practices pose to normal and abnormally 
functioning individuals who use the practices. For example, in Chapter 3, I 
discuss how the risks of GH therapy are typically viewed as acceptable in 
instances of GHD or other diseases, otherwise known as abnormal 
functioning, while the risks of GH therapy are typically viewed as 
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unacceptable in instances when children are functioning normally. Diagnosis-
based arguments rely on the idea that the treatment/enhancement 
distinction is also a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable risks. 
However, in Chapter 3, I argue that the risks of GH therapy may be 
acceptable for parents of normally functioning children to take for their 
children in the instance that their children are extremely short and GH 
therapy is expected to be reasonably safe and effective. 
 I also examine the risks of enhancement practices in Chapters 4 and 5 
in regard to cognitive enhancing drugs and athletic performance enhancing 
drugs, respectively. The acceptability of risks in these contexts is discussed in 
relation to fairness in competition and how drug use by some individuals 
affect individuals who do not desire to take drugs. I also discuss how 
explanations of concepts like disease and health determine acceptability of 
medical intervention, and not the treatment/enhancement distinction. 
 Natural inequalities, social and professional environments, and 
acceptable and unacceptable risks (and others) are all arguments that I 
discuss throughout this dissertation to support the contention that the 
treatment/enhancement distinction does not motivate arguments that draw 
conclusions about justice in health care. These arguments show that 
determining who ought to be allowed to use enhancement practices and for 
what purposes requires more than the treatment/enhancement distinction. 
Furthermore, these arguments show that the treatment/enhancement 
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distinction is not always synonymous with acceptable and unacceptable 
intervention or risks. 
 
Implications for Justice in Health Care 
What follows are the main conclusions drawn in this dissertation: 
1) The treatment/enhancement distinction is not an independent 
 concept. 
2) Arguments concerning justice in health care that draw conclusions 
about how to allocate resources based on what practices are 
treatment and what practices are enhancement must rely on 
normative accounts of concepts such as health, disease, normality, 
and human functioning. 
3) The treatment/enhancement distinction is not always synonymous 
with acceptable and unacceptable intervention. 
4) As a matter of justice in health care, arguments concerning the 
allocation of enhancement practices have to consider the needs of 
normally functioning individuals as well as abnormally functioning 
individuals because of the potential benefits of enhancement 
practices. 
These conclusions have practical implications for justice in health care. 
Relying on these conclusions, the relevance of the treatment/enhancement 
distinction in decisions concerning allocation of resources must be 
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diminished. Instead, health care professionals have to examine the concepts 
on which they rely to make allocation decisions. If decisions about health care 
intervention that rely on explanations of concepts like health, disease, and 
human functioning prevent normally functioning individuals who suffer from 
their ailments in the same ways that abnormally functioning individuals 
suffer from their ailments, then we have to reconsider our decisions. 
 The treatment/enhancement distinction is not a static concept. We 
must be willing to alter the role of the treatment/enhancement distinction 
because of the possible ways that enhancement practices can change our 
lives. Enhancement practices are capable of helping us accomplish our career 
and personal goals. They are capable of helping us to be the individual that 
we want to be—physically, emotionally, and intellectually. Because of the 
known benefits of current enhancement practices, and the promise of future 
enhancement practices, we have to be delicate in our deliberations about 
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